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REVISITING THE TAXATION OF FRINGE BENEFITS 
Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas
*
 
Abstract: The receipt of workplace fringe benefits has become increasingly ubiquitous. 
As a result of their employment, employees often receive a cornucopia of fringe benefits, 
including frequent-flier miles, hotel rewards points, rental car preferred status, office supply 
dollar coupons, cellular telephone use, home internet service, and, in some instances, even 
free lunches, massages, and dance lessons. Technological advances and workforce 
globalization are important contributory factors to the popularity of what were, until the turn 
of this century, previously unknown fringe benefits. 
In years past, taxpayers could readily turn to the Internal Revenue Code to ascertain the 
income tax effects and reporting responsibilities associated with fringe benefit receipt. 
However, today’s fringe benefits have evolved far beyond what Congress contemplated when 
it enacted fringe benefit reform over thirty years ago. As a result, the existing statutory tax 
compliance framework does not adequately address the recent transformation of the 
workplace, as many modern fringe benefits are not specifically excluded from the income tax 
base yet are not currently being reported as taxable. 
This Article examines what has been an increasingly commonplace phenomenon: 
employers and employees ignoring their responsibilities to report the receipt of fringe 
benefits as taxable income. It argues that Congress has an obligation to preserve the tax base 
and, accordingly, must institute reform measures to ensure taxpayer compliance. Failure to 
take action will trigger an expansion of such fringe benefit offerings, eroding the tax base and 
jeopardizing the integrity of the income tax system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over a quarter of a century ago, through targeted legislative reforms, 
Congress sought to end the practice of not reporting on-the-job fringe 
benefits as taxable income.
1
 The congressional fixes are found in several 
different Internal Revenue Code (Code) sections
2
: Code section 61(a)(1) 
added the phrase “fringe benefits” to its description of gross income,3 
Code section 132 excluded from gross income certain specifically 
defined fringe benefits,
4
 and employment tax provisions (i.e., Code 
sections 3121(a), 3306(b), 3401(a), and 3501(b)) expanded the 
application of payroll taxes to include taxable fringe benefits.
5
 The 
                                                     
1. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
2. All Code references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
3. Deficit Reduction Act § 531(c), 98 Stat. at 884. The IRS defines “fringe benefit” as follows: 
“A fringe benefit is a form of pay for the performance of services.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
PUBLICATION 15-B, EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS: FOR USE IN 2016, at 3 (2015), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T48-ATEJ]. 
4. Deficit Reduction Act § 531(a)(1), 98 Stat. at 877–81. 
5. Id. § 531(d)(1)(A), (d)(3)–(5), 98 Stat. at 884–85. 
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legislative history underlying these reform measures indicates that 
Congress designed these Code sections to clarify the law, limit tax base 
erosion, and curtail the practice of employers transforming taxable 
remuneration into tax-free fringe benefits.
6
 
But a surprising situation has recently occurred. The country is awash 
in fringe benefits inuring to employees,
7
 a sizable portion of which 
currently goes unreported as taxable income.
8
 These newly minted fringe 
benefits generally fall within one of three categories: (1) “customer 
                                                     
6. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 (Comm. Print 1984). The 
legislative history warned that, absent reform and “without any well-defined limits on the ability of 
employers to compensate their employees tax-free by providing noncash benefits having economic 
value to the employee, new practices will emerge that could shrink the income tax base 
significantly . . . [and] further shift a disproportionate tax burden to those individuals whose 
compensation is in the form of cash.” Id. at 841. 
7. For example, the provision of free cell phones to employees has become increasingly 
ubiquitous. See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., 2014 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 22, tbl.D-1 (2014), 
https://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Documents/14-0301%20Beneftis_Report_ 
TEXT_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST8Z-TAG] (finding that forty-one percent of employers offer 
free personal use of a business cell phone). A number of other fringe benefits have originated with 
companies in Silicon Valley. See, e.g., Jillian D’Onfro & Kevin Smith, Google Employees Reveal 
Their Favorite Perks Working for the Company, BUS. INSIDER (July 1, 2014, 10:06 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/google-employees-favorite-perks-2014-7# [https://perma.cc/9TE2-
YPMH] (describing the numerous fringe benefits that Google employees can enjoy); Meghan 
Keneally, Noisy Massage Chairs, Over-Inflated Egos and Too Much Free Food, It’s a Hard Life at 
Google: Employees Take to Web to Gripe About Their Job Perks, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:23 
PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2487276/Former-Google-employees-complain-job-
perks.html [https://perma.cc/4AH3-6X8W] (same); J.P. Mangalindan, Google: The King of Perks, 
CNN MONEY (Jan. 30, 2012, 3:18 PM), http://archive.fortune.com/galleries/2012/technology/ 
1201/gallery.best-companies-google-perks.fortune/2.html [https://perma.cc/BC95-L4AM] (same); 
Melinda Wenner Moyer, Behind the Scenes at Google’s Cafeteria, BON APPÉTIT (Feb. 19, 2013, 
10:00 AM), http://www.bonappetit.com/trends/article/behind-the-scenes-at-google-s-cafeteria 
[https://perma.cc/G3BF-C2UE] (“As if Google perks like nap pods and on-site masseuses didn’t 
already stoke your envy, the tech giant has reinvented workday dining. Its offices in Mountain 
View, California, and Manhattan have more than 35 canteens offering fresh, delicious meals and 
hundreds of pantry-like ‘micro-kitchens’ stocked with snacks and beverages (including Kind 
granola bars and Stumptown coffee). And it’s all free.”). Google is apparently not alone in offering 
such benefits. Other technology companies such as Facebook, Twitter, Zynga, and Yahoo offer 
generous fringe benefits as well. Mark Maremont, Silicon Valley’s Mouthwatering Tax Break, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873240503045784084 
61566171752 [https://perma.cc/Y7JT-Z9KG]. 
8. See, e.g., Austin L. Lomax, Five-Star Exclusion: Modern Silicon Valley Companies Are 
Pushing the Limits of Section 119 by Providing Tax-Free Meals to Employees, 71 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 2077 (2014) (describing the nonreporting practices of both employers and employees with 
regard to the many third-party-provided fringe benefits of work); Michael Lundin & Claudia 
Cowan, IRS Considers Taxing Work Perks Like Food, Gym Memberships, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 16, 
2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/04/16/irs-considers-taxing-work-perks-like-food-
gym-memberships/ [https://perma.cc/77XR-H597] (“The IRS reportedly is looking at these perks 
and seeing if these companies need to start paying up for the free stuff they offer employees.”). 
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loyalty programs” such as frequent-flier miles, rental car usage, hotel 
frequency stays, and office supply purchases; (2) mixed-use 
(business/personal) assets such as cellular phones and home internet 
service; and (3) workplace lifestyle enhancements such as the receipt of 
free lunches, massages, and dance classes. None of these benefits existed 
in their present form until the turn of the century, and many are provided 
by unrelated third-party vendors rather than the employers themselves. 
The evolution of this new era of fringe benefits can be traced to 
technological advancements and the increasing globalization of the 
workforce over the past several decades.
9
 
Because the aforementioned fringe benefits are not statutorily 
excluded from gross income under Code section 132, they are 
presumably includable in gross income under Code section 61.
10
 
However, these new fringe benefits often go unreported, with no clear 
statutory or regulatory justification.
11
 There are numerous possible 
reasons why these fringe benefits are rarely reported as taxable income. 
Their valuation is inherently problematic; their putative “tax-free status” 
has tremendous political support; recordkeeping for these benefits is 
administratively challenging; and, over the past quarter of a century, 
payroll taxes have dramatically risen, making noncompliance more 
economically attractive.
12
 Further, the nonreporting of certain benefits 
like employer-provided cellphones has received the blessing of the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
13
 while non-enforcement with respect to 
other types of benefits (e.g., frequent flyer miles) suggests the IRS’s tacit 
approval. 
As more employers and employees take advantage of these 
unreported fringe benefits, Congress must ponder its options. Possible 
approaches include expanding the list of those fringe benefits excluded 
from gross income, explicitly stating that some or all of the 
aforementioned fringe benefits are taxable, and/or denying employer 
deductions for expenditures pertaining to securing these fringe 
benefits.
14
 In light of growing taxpayer noncompliance, Congress would 
be wise not to ignore this problem. 
This Article urges immediate congressional action. It argues that, if 
                                                     
9. See infra Section II.A. 
10. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955) (finding that the congressional 
intention is “to tax all gains except those specifically exempted”). 
11. See Lomax, supra note 8, at 2082–83. 
12. See infra Section II.C. 
13. See infra notes 144–45 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra Part III. 
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left unaddressed, the failure to tax modern fringe benefits will have 
continuing pernicious effects on the income tax system. Not only does 
failing to tax fringe benefits shortchange the government and public of 
valuable tax revenue on income associated with those benefits, it also 
perpetuates the notion that tax enforcement is arbitrary and ill-defined.
15
 
Additionally, not enforcing taxation of certain fringe benefits, while 
taxing comparable amounts of cash compensation, unfairly favors those 
employees who have access to fringe benefits.
16
 Failing to tax fringe 
benefits also encourages wasteful spending. More specifically, because 
employers do not have to factor in taxes when setting compensation 
amounts, it is cheaper for employers to compensate their employees with 
untaxed fringe benefits instead of cash, resulting in their overprovision. 
This Article makes several contributions to the existing literature. 
First, it identifies and describes a new era of fringe benefits not 
contemplated by the current statutory regime. We offer historical context 
for the evolution of these fringe benefits and identify the unique 
challenges that policymakers face in designing a workable tax scheme. 
Next, we offer a number of concrete policy recommendations for taxing 
fringe benefits in the modern era. While some commentators have 
argued that modern fringe benefit offerings should be subject to tax in 
theory,
17
 this Article offers practical guiding principles intended to 
address concerns like valuation, recordkeeping, and the current political 
climate. 
In making its case, this Article proceeds as follows: in Part I, we 
present an abbreviated history of fringe benefit taxation. Part II then 
                                                     
15. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income 
Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829, 832 (2012) (criticizing I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621, 
in which the agency declared that it will not pursue a tax-enforcement program with respect to 
promotional programs, pointing out that unless Congress acts, the IRS will be able to create “a de 
facto, or customary, gross income exclusion, despite the absence of any statutory authority for its 
position”). 
16. See, e.g., JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 61 (16th ed. 2012) (“Every 
tax system that attempts to tax wage income must contend with the nettlesome problem of 
employer-provided fringe benefits . . . . [F]ailing to tax these benefits creates problems of 
fairness . . . .”); WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 73 (5th ed. 1999) 
(“Omission of noncash items in the computation of taxable income is unfair because it imposes a 
smaller burden on some taxpayers than on others in similar overall circumstances.”); Note, Federal 
Income Taxation of Employee Fringe Benefits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1142–43 (1976) (arguing 
that failure to tax fringe benefits violates horizontal equity and is also regressive if highly 
compensated employees have greater access to fringe benefits). But see Yehonatan Givati, Googling 
a Free Lunch: The Taxation of Fringe Benefits, 69 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that, 
in a competitive market, failing to tax fringe benefits does not violate horizontal equity because 
employers will adjust the wages of employees who receive fringe benefits). 
17. See, e.g., Givati, supra note 16.   
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discusses the underlying nature of these newly minted fringe benefits 
and their evolution alongside recent technological developments and 
workplace globalization. In Part III, we discuss possible reform 
measures that Congress should consider and their application. 
I. SELECTIVE HISTORY OF THE TAXATION OF FRINGE 
BENEFITS 
From the inception of the income tax in 1913, the receipt of fringe 
benefits has been an integral part of the nation’s economic landscape.18 
Over this time period, the tax treatment of fringe benefits has undergone 
three distinct stages: (1) the IRS issuance of informal and piecemeal 
guidance, (2) the promulgation in 1976 of proposed regulations by the 
Treasury Department, and (3) the passage of congressional legislation in 
1984. 
A. IRS Guidance 
The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution authorized a national 
income tax, and in 1913 Congress quickly followed with the passage of 
the nation’s first constitutionally sanctioned federal income tax.19 
Needless to say, in its infancy, the income tax’s initial statutory 
formulation was fairly rudimentary with few details expounded.
20
 In 
many instances, it was implicitly delegated to the IRS to amplify the 
law’s meaning. 
When it came to the taxation of fringe benefits, on several occasions 
the IRS responded to this embellishment challenge with administrative 
rulings. The first instance was in 1920, when the IRS ruled that group 
term life insurance did not constitute taxable income insofar as the 
employee benefited “only in the feeling of contentment that provision 
has been made for dependents. It is paid by the employer not as 
                                                     
18. See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan & Dawson J. Price, Change and the Continuity in Fringe Benefit 
Taxation: Seeking Sense and Sensibility, 59 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 281, 302 (2014/15) (“From the 
earliest days of the income tax system, Congress and the IRS have struggled to create a sensible 
framework for the treatment of fringe benefits.”). 
19. Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114. 
20. If the number of words serves as a proxy for detail, consider the fact that in 1913 the income 
tax law totaled approximately 11,000 words, see Tariff Act, 38 Stat. at 166–81; 144 CONG. REC. 
H2136 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1998) (statement of Rep. Robert Goodlatte); by way of contrast, the 
number of words presently in the Code exceeds one million, see Joseph Henchman, How Many 
Words Is the Tax Code?, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 15, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/how-many-
words-are-tax-code [https://perma.cc/9VKN-8T5Z] (estimating that in 2013 the Code contained 
over one million words). 
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compensation to the employee, but as an investment in increased 
efficiency.”21 In the same year, the agency issued Office Decision (O.D.) 
514,
22
 declaring that occasional cash meal allowances were excluded 
from income.
23
 One year later, in O.D. 946,
24
 the IRS ruled that the value 
of train travel offered to railroad employees and their families was 
excluded from income as a gift, as long as the travel was “not provided 
for in the contracts of employment.”25 Several decades later, in Revenue 
Ruling 59-58,
26
 the IRS announced that de minimis fringe benefits are 
not taxable; more specifically, “the value of a turkey, ham, or other item 
of merchandise of similar nominal value, distributed by an employer to 
an employee at Christmas, or a comparable holiday, as part of a general 
distribution . . . as a means of promoting their good will” is exempt from 
income.
27
 
The foregoing IRS administrative rulings are marked by their brevity. 
Notwithstanding this brevity, these rulings spawned entirely new 
categories of income that were treated as exempt from taxation (without 
any authorization from Congress).
28
 The group term insurance ruling led 
employees to exclude from income the value of group term life 
insurance offered by their employers (the precursor to Code section 
79(a)); the “meal money” ruling undoubtedly led many employees to 
believe that meals (and possibly lodging) furnished for the convenience 
of their employers were not subject to taxation (the precursor to Code 
section 119); the “train travel” ruling undoubtedly led many employees 
to believe that no-additional-cost services provided by their employers 
were not taxable (the precursor to Code section 132(b)); and the “turkey 
and ham” ruling undoubtedly led many employees to believe that de 
minimis fringe benefits that their employers provided were not taxable 
(the precursor to Code section 132(e)).
29
 
                                                     
21. O. 1014, 2 C.B. 88, 89 (1920), 1920 WL 48481. 
22. O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920), 1920 WL 49099. 
23. Id. 
24. O.D. 946, 4 C.B. 110 (1921), 1921 WL 50801. 
25. Id.   
26. Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 I.R.B. 17, 1959 WL 12389. 
27. Id. at 18. 
28. See Zelenak, supra note 15, at 843 (“As the government admitted in its brief in a 1962 
Supreme Court case, under the IRS’s administrative practice fringe benefits were ‘not 
generally . . . considered income to the employees even if the employer’s sole reason for providing 
them [was] to confer a benefit upon the employees—e.g., provision of parking facilities, medical 
services, swimming pools, libraries, courtesy discounts, etc.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Brief 
for the United States at 39, Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962) (No. 396)). 
29. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text. 
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But the problem with the IRS approach to fringe benefit taxation was 
its fragmentation and lack of overall cohesive structure. In the absence 
of uniformity, some taxpayers pushed the definitional limits of what 
constituted tax-free fringe benefits.
30
 Something more comprehensive 
had to be implemented. 
B. Treasury Department Regulations 
In an attempt to bring uniformity to the fringe benefit area of the law, 
the Treasury Department in 1975 issued a discussion draft of all-
inclusive regulations.
31
 These regulations had three categories of benefits 
that qualified for tax-free treatment: (1) those that resulted in no 
substantial extra costs to employers, (2) those that passed a “facts and 
circumstances” test, and (3) those that qualified as de minimis in 
nature.
32
 
Qualifying for the “no substantial costs to employers” provision 
required the satisfaction of three conjunctive conditions: the goods or 
services originated from the employer and were “primarily unrelated to 
the personal use or consumption of such items by employees of the 
employer,” the supplying employer incurred no substantial extra costs in 
the provision of such goods or services, and there was no discrimination 
of benefit offerings between and among employees.
33
 The Treasury 
Department then cited two examples of such benefits: free flights offered 
to airline attendants (precursor to Code section 132(b) (i.e., no-
additional-cost services)) and merchandise discounts offered to store 
employees (precursor to Code section 132(c) (i.e., qualified employee 
discounts)).
34
 
Next, under the so-called “facts and circumstances” test, the draft 
regulations offered nine circumstances that tended “to indicate that the 
benefit does not constitute compensation includable in gross income.”35 
                                                     
30. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-37-012 (May 25, 1983) (stating that a builder’s 
proposed five percent to ten percent employee discount on the retail price of a home did not qualify 
as a de minimis fringe benefit). 
31. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (Sept. 5, 1975). 
32. Id. § 1.61-16(a)–(c), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,119–20. 
33. Id. § 1.61-16(a), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,119. 
34. Id. § 1.61-16(f)(1), (3), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,120. 
35. Id. § 1.61-16(b), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,119–20. Factors included whether the “benefit is provided 
primarily to insure the employee’s safety by protecting against significant risk arising from the 
employment relation,” whether “the benefit is not a substantial amount absolutely or in comparison 
to the employee’s stated compensation,” and whether the benefit “generally is not thought of as 
constituting compensation includible in gross income.” Id. § 1.61-16(b), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,120. 
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These circumstances attempted to codify existing practices insofar as the 
receipt of fringe benefits was concerned.
36
 However, many 
commentators, practitioners, and politicians found this “facts and 
circumstances” test so obtuse that they faulted its proposed application.37 
Finally, the draft regulations offered an exception to the concept of 
gross income for de minimis fringe benefits. Benefits that qualified for 
this exception were defined as those items “so small as to make 
accounting for [them] unreasonable or administratively impractical.”38 In 
theory, this rationale made sense; however, the Treasury Department set 
forth several examples (e.g., bar association dues paid by the taxpayer’s 
law firm)
39
 that were neither small in absolute dollar amounts nor hard to 
track and thus did not conform with the stated rationale for this 
exception. 
As drafted, the proposed Treasury regulations were not well-
received.
40
 As a result, the Treasury Department withdrew them the 
following year.
41
 Congress then stepped in and issued a moratorium on 
the further issuance of regulations, rulings, or procedures that would 
alter the historic tax treatment of fringe benefits.
42
 To avoid leaving a 
legislative void, however, Congress established a special fringe benefit 
task force that went to work on putting together draft legislation.
43
 
C. Congressional Legislation 
In 1984, Congress sought to bring uniformity to this area of the law. It 
therefore passed sweeping legislation, embodied in the Deficit 
                                                     
36. See Note, supra note 16, at 1163–64; see also Fringe Benefits; Notice of Publication of 
Discussion Draft of Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118, 41,118–19 (proposed Sept. 5, 1975) (to be 
codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12) (discussing the need to provide guidance with respect to administrative 
practices that allowed exclusion of certain fringe benefits from employees’ income). 
37. See Note, supra note 16, at 1163–69 (critiquing the nine factors and finding some to be 
“problematic” and “puzzling”). 
38. Fringe Benefits; Notice of Publication of Discussion Draft of Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. at 
41,119.  
39. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16(f)(17), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,121. 
40. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND 
GIFTS ¶ 63.1.1. (rev. 3d ed. 2005) (“Caught in a heated cross fire between critics who found the 
proposed regulations too lenient and those who thought they were too severe, the Treasury withdrew 
its draft in 1976.”). 
41. Fringe Benefits: Withdrawal of Discussion Draft of Proposed Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 
56,334 (1976). 
42. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996, 996. 
43. STAFF OF TASK FORCE ON EMP. FRINGE BENEFITS, H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 96TH 
CONG., DISCUSSION DRAFT BILL AND REPORT ON EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS (Comm. Print 
1979). 
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Reduction Act of 1984,
44
 that fundamentally transformed the fringe 
benefit landscape.
45
 The stated objectives of this legislation were 
threefold: first, to “codify the ability of employers to continue many of 
these practices without imposition of income or payroll taxes”;46 second, 
to “set forth clear boundaries for the provision of tax-free benefits”;47 
and third, to “[curtail] new practices [that might] emerge that could 
shrink the income tax base significantly . . . . [and] further shift a 
disproportionate tax burden to those individuals whose compensation is 
in the form of cash.”48 
How did Congress accomplish its stated objectives? First, it clarified 
the scope of Code section 61 by explicitly including the phrase “fringe 
benefits.”49 Next, it added Code section 132, which specifically 
enumerated those fringe benefits that were to be excluded from gross 
income.
50
 Finally, it expanded the payroll tax provisions to include 
within their scope the value of fringe benefits that inured to employees’ 
benefit.
51
 
At the time, the sweeping congressional solution to the problem of 
fringe benefit taxation was generally lauded by both the academic 
community and the general public
52—and for good reason: Congress had 
instituted what seemed to be a comprehensive and practical solution to 
the receipt of tax-free fringe benefits, a problem that had previously 
plagued the nation and threatened the integrity of the tax base. From a 
legislative perspective, it was therefore hailed, giving the appearance 
that this area of the law could theoretically be put on autopilot. 
But soon after Congress instituted this comprehensive legislative 
reform, a series of unanticipated events unfolded that fundamentally 
transformed the topography of the fringe benefit landscape: customer 
loyalty programs came into vogue,
53
 new technological devices and 
services emerged (i.e., cellular telephones and the internet),
54
 and the 
                                                     
44. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
45. Id. 
46. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 840. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 841. 
49. Deficit Reduction Act § 531(c), 98 Stat. at 884. 
50. Id. § 531(a)(1), 98 Stat. at 877–81. 
51. Id. § 531(d), 98 Stat. at 884–85. 
52. See generally Wayne M. Gazur, Assessing Internal Revenue Code Section 132 After Twenty 
Years, 25 VA. TAX REV. 977 (2006). 
53. See infra Section II.A.1. 
54. See infra Section II.A.2. 
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workforce became more globalized.
55
 The 1984 congressional legislation 
left unaddressed how the fringe benefits associated with these 
transformative events should be taxed. 
The next Part of this Article explores the nature of these 
transformative events and how they led to the emergence of new 
categories of fringe benefits the likes of which were entirely unknown 
until the turn of the twenty-first century. 
II. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND THE 
REENGINEERED FRINGE BENEFIT 
While it is not easy to make broad generalizations about the twenty-
first century and the Information Era,
56
 there is at least one noticeable 
trend when it comes to workplace fringe benefits. In the past, fringe 
benefits predominately originated directly from employers (e.g., seeking 
to build camaraderie and kinship, an employer would offer significant 
discounts to its employees on the products it sold).
57
 Fringe benefits of 
this nature no doubt will continue to be a vibrant part of the nation’s 
employment landscape. What is truly new in the twenty-first century, 
however, is the advent of fringe benefits that typically originate from 
third-party vendors, such as airlines, hotel chains, rental car companies, 
office supply vendors,
58
 and internet and cell phone providers. These 
modern benefits represent a departure from the fringe benefits of 
yesteryear, which typically involved employers providing discounted or 
free use of their own goods or services, such as railroad employees 
receiving free train travel. While the legislative history to section 132 
clearly contemplates exempting many employer-provided fringes, there 
is no indication that Congress intended to extend this treatment to third-
party provided benefits.
59
 These third-party-provided fringe benefits 
                                                     
55. See infra Section II.A.3. 
56. For a concise description of the so-called Information Age, see generally NICHOLAS 
NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995). 
57. See generally Fringe Benefit, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA U.S. ECON. HIST., 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Fringe_Benefit.aspx [https://perma.cc/G4PJ-2X76] (last visited 
May 8, 2016) (“Fringe benefits can be generally divided into those offered individually, such as 
401(k) retirement plans, and those offered to employees as a group, such as daycare facilities or free 
lunch.”). 
58. See, e.g., Tax Analysts, A History of the Frequent Flyer Program, 38 TAX NOTES 1311 
(1988) (describing how the frequent-flier program got off the ground). 
59. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 840 (“Congress was aware that in 
many industries, employees may receive, either free or at a discount, goods and services which the 
employer sells to the general public. . . . Although employees receive an economic benefit from the 
availability of these free or discounted goods or services, employers often have valid business 
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financially benefit employees and are not specifically exempt from 
income;
60
 nevertheless, they often go unreported by both employers and 
employees.
61
 
This Part is arranged as follows: Section A explores the genesis of 
modern fringe benefits that, prior to the turn of the twenty-first century, 
were largely unknown. Section B offers a brief theoretical overview of 
how the receipt of these fringe benefits should be taxed.
62
 Section C 
details the reasons that such fringe benefits often go unreported. Finally, 
Section D provides an overview of the current political landscape and 
the challenges of reform. 
A. The Advent of Modern Fringe Benefits 
As the nation has progressed from the Industrial Era (when 
manufacturing dominated the economic marketplace)
63
 to the Post-
Industrial Era (when service offerings dominated the economic 
marketplace)
64
 to the Information Era (when computers and technology 
dominate the economic marketplace),
65
 the workplace has been 
reshaped, work-related technology has filtered into employees’ personal 
lives, and globalization has led to intense competition to lure the best 
and brightest minds—all of which has led to the emergence of new kinds 
of fringe benefits. This fringe benefit evolution is developed and 
explored in the following three subsections: (1) the growth of customer 
loyalty programs, (2) the ubiquity of cellular telephones and internet 
service, and (3) the fundamental transformation of the employee 
workplace. 
1. Customer Loyalty Programs 
In the modern era of fringe benefits, many employees earn rewards 
through customer loyalty programs like airline frequent-flier programs. 
                                                     
reasons, other than simply providing compensation, for encouraging employees to avail themselves 
of the products which those employees sell to the public.”).  
60. I.R.C. § 132(a) (2012). 
61. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(d), 98 Stat. 494, 884–85 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
62. The tax consequences associated with each of these benefits will be discussed in considerably 
more detail in Part III.  
63. For a concise description of the so-called Industrial Era, see generally T.S. ASHTON, THE 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1760–1830 (1948).  
64. For a concise description of the so-called Post-Industrial Era, see generally DANIEL BELL, 
THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1976). 
65. See NEGROPONTE, supra note 56. 
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In the employment context, these rewards are generally earned through 
business-related travel expenses or office supply expenses that are paid 
for by the employer either directly or through reimbursements. Although 
the employer incurs the out-of-pocket costs that generate the rewards, 
the rewards generally inure to the benefit of the employees. For 
example, an employee might accrue enough frequent-flier miles through 
work-related travel to purchase a free airline ticket to use on his next 
vacation. These relatively new fringe benefits are a by-product of a 
rapidly growing customer loyalty program industry. 
The genesis of customer loyalty rewards programs likely dates back 
to select supermarket chains offering S&H Green Stamps to their repeat 
customers.
66
 The more frequently customers returned and made 
purchases, the more S&H Green Stamps they would earn, which were 
redeemable for “free” gifts.67 Because these so-called free gifts were 
essentially bargain purchases, neither Congress nor the IRS ever sought 
to tax their economic value.
68
 
As the technology underlying computer software advanced and data 
storage capacities grew, the opportunity for more sophisticated customer 
loyalty programs expanded. Customers would no longer have to lick and 
maintain books of musty stamps. The airline industry was the first to tap 
into this then-novel technology. In May 1981, with new computer 
programs and enhanced data storage capacities in hand, American 
                                                     
66. Jennifer Lach, Redeeming Qualities, ADVERT. AGE (May 1, 2000), http://adage.com/article/ 
american-demographics/redeeming-qualities/42382/ [https://perma.cc/3MJQ-UYWT]. The name 
“S&H” derives from the issuer of the stamps, the Sperry & Hutchinson Company. Id. 
67. Today, S&H has converted its Green Stamps into “Greenpoints,” which can be redeemed 
online for gift cards from retailers like Barnes & Noble, Fandango, and Sports Authority. S&H 
GREENPOINTS, http://w3.greenpoints.com/ [https://perma.cc/CEJ8-RNH2] (last visited June 8, 
2015). 
68. Taxpayers who purchase goods or services at arm’s length generally do not realize gross 
income in connection with a bargain purchase, whether it is in the form of a seller rebate or a below 
fair-market-value price. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Milk Co. v. Comm’r, 26 T.C. 707 (1956); Rev. Rul. 
2008-26, 2008-1 C.B. 985; Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1 C.B. 23. In the case of customer rewards 
programs, the predominant view is that such rewards are equivalent to nontaxable rebates if they are 
earned through cash purchases by the customer. For example, in the case of cash rewards earned 
through personal airline travel, the IRS has ruled that:  
a passenger will not realize gross income upon the receipt of a cash payment if the flights that 
entitled the passenger to receive the payment were undertaken for personal, nondeductible 
purposes. Instead, the payment will simply reduce the passenger’s cost of the tickets purchased 
under a purchase price adjustment rationale. 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9340007 (June 29, 1993), http://www.legalbitstream.com/scripts/ 
isyswebext.dll?op=get&uri=/isysquery/irl83c2/1/doc [https://perma.cc/8XHZ-NYBS]; see also 
Sharon Alice Pouzar, Frequent Flyer Awards as Taxable Income: Time to Pay the Tax Man, 5 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 55, 64–65 (1998). 
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Airlines launched the world’s first-ever frequent-flier program,69 and a 
few months later both Delta and TWA followed with frequent-flier 
programs of their own.
70
 
As the airline industries’ frequent-flier programs soared, businesses in 
the hotel industry began to develop loyalty programs of their own. At 
first, the hotel industry partnered with the airline industry, offering 
frequent-flier miles to those guests who repeatedly used their services.
71
 
Soon thereafter, however, the hotel industry developed its own loyalty 
programs. In January 1983, for example, Holiday Inn launched the 
world’s first large-scale hotel loyalty program, which was quickly 
followed by Marriott doing the same.
72
 
The rental car industry mimicked the hotel industry’s approach. It 
initially partnered with the airline industry to offer frequent-flier miles, 
but as technology advanced many rental car companies independently 
devised their own customer loyalty programs.
73
 The first to offer such a 
stand-alone program was National Rental Car—in March 1987, it 
introduced its Emerald Club,
74
 which was followed by similar programs 
offered by the majority of other rental car companies.
75
 
                                                     
69. Lee S. Garsson, Frequent Flyer Bonus Programs: To Tax or Not to Tax—Is This the Only 
Question?, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 973 (1987); David M. Rowell, A History of U.S. Airline 
Deregulation Part 4: 1979–2010: The Effects of Deregulation—Lower Fares, More Travel, 
Frequent Flier Programs, TRAVEL INSIDER (Aug. 13, 2010), http://thetravelinsider.info/ 
airlinemismanagement/airlinederegulation2.htm [https://perma.cc/UG73-F37R]. 
70. See Rowell, supra note 69. 
71. See Ed Watkins, The History and Evolution of Hotel Loyalty, HOTEL NEWS NOW (Aug. 11, 
2013, 6:09 PM), http://www.hotelnewsnow.com/Article/11029/The-history-and-evolution-of-hotel-
loyalty#sthash.FUEljQdH.dpuf [https://perma.cc/HJ7Q-LFGA] (“The first generation of hotel 
loyalty schemes were simply conduits to airline programs: Currency earned in hotel programs could 
be used toward free flights on participating airlines.”). 
72. See id. (“Two brands lay claim to firsts involving frequency programs in the hotel industry. 
Holiday Inn launched its program in February 1983, followed by Marriott in November of the same 
year.”). 
73. Ryan Lile, How Rental Car Companies Can Get More Mileage, COLLOQUY (Apr. 18, 2014), 
https://www.colloquy.com/latest-news/how-rental-car-companies-can-get-more-mileage/ 
[https://perma.cc/6KET-QHRW] (“Until recently, rental car companies had not done much to 
differentiate themselves in terms of loyalty. These companies have interfaced with airline and hotel 
programs by offering renters frequent flyer miles or hotel points, but have not innovated loyalty 
products of their own.”). 
74. Press Release, Enter. Holdings, National Car Rental’s Emerald Club Marks 25 Years of 
Customer Choice, Convenience (Mar. 8, 2012), https://www.enterpriseholdings.com/press-
room/national-car-rentals-emerald-club-marks-25-years-of-customer-choice-convenience.html 
[https://perma.cc/7T3E-J63A] (“National Car Rental, the premier car rental brand for business 
travel, this month celebrates the 25th anniversary of the Emerald Club, the car rental industry’s first 
frequent renter program. The Emerald Club launched on St. Patrick’s Day in 1987.”). 
75. See, e.g., Gold Plus Rewards, HERTZ, https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/emember/rewards-
overview/loyalty-free-travel-program [https://perma.cc/JX48-8FVG] (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).  
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The popularity of customer loyalty programs extends well beyond the 
service industry. Beginning in April 2007, for example, office supply 
companies such as Staples began to offer customer loyalty programs.
76
 
The business platform of such programs is simple: purchase your office 
supplies with us, and, in return, we will award you with “cash coupons” 
that you can use in any fashion that you want throughout the store, 
including to purchase personal-use items such as electronic devices, 
furniture, and supplies.
77
 
Fast-forward to the present. Customer loyalty programs are 
omnipresent and continue to grow in popularity. Facts and figures 
regarding these programs are stunning. U.S. consumers held more than 
three billion customer loyalty program memberships in 2014, over 900 
million of which were attributable to the travel and hospitality 
industries.
78
 Total memberships are up twenty-six percent from 2012 and 
have more than tripled since 2000.
79
 A 2010 study estimated the total 
value of customer rewards and points to be $48 billion, with over $17 
billion allocable to airline, hotel, and other travel-related rewards.
80
 As 
                                                     
76. Staples Inc., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Staples_Inc [https://perma.cc/PR4Y-
5N29] (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
77. Staples Rewards Program, STAPLES.COM, http://www.staples.com/sbd/content/help-center/ 
staples-rewards-program.html#10005_14 [https://perma.cc/AWS8-GDL2] (last visited June 24, 
2015) (“For any purchase you make (excluding postage stamps, phone/gift cards, savings passes), 
you earn up to 5% back in rewards. Staples Rewards® are issued online monthly at 
staples.com/rewards in increments of $5. Monthly balances of less than $5 will roll over through the 
end of the following calendar quarter.”). 
78. JEFF BERRY, THE 2015 COLLOQUY LOYALTY CENSUS: BIG NUMBERS, BIG HURDLES 5 
(2015), https://www.colloquy.com/resources/pdf/reports/2015-loyalty-census.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
MGF9-WKRX]. 
79. Id. at 2 (“The big finding in the 2015 Census is that the membership growth shows no signs of 
slowing . . . .”); see also Lena Steinhoff & Robert W. Palmatier, Understanding Loyalty Program 
Effectiveness: Managing Target and Bystander Effects, J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI., Aug. 22, 2014, 
http://foster.uw.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/loyalty-program.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5LL-
ZZHB] (“Loyalty programs, in business practice and as a focus of marketing research, have become 
vastly popular, such that U.S. companies spend more than $1.2 billion on them each year, program 
participation has topped 2.6 billion, and the average U.S. household subscribes to 21.9 different 
programs.”); The Lowdown on Customer Loyalty Programs, FORBES MAG. (Jan. 2, 2007), 
http://www.forbes.com/2007/01/02/frequent-flyer-miles-ent-sales-cx_kw_0102whartonloyalty.html 
[https://perma.cc/D8K8-R5YW] (“According to Jupiter Research, more than 75% of consumers 
today have at least one loyalty card, and the number of people with two or more is estimated to be 
one-third of the shopping population. Surveys by information-technology analysts Gartner, 
Forrester Research and META Group suggest the data-for-dollars explosion is showing no signs of 
letting up anytime soon.”). 
80. NANCY GORDON & KELLY HLAVINKA, COLLOQUY TALK, BURIED TREASURE: THE 2011 
FORECAST OF U.S. CONSUMER LOYALTY PROGRAM POINTS VALUE (2011), 
http://www.swiftexchange.com/Content/Documents/2011-COLLOQUY-Liability-Talk-White-
Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQN2-T76R].  
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evidenced by these dollar figures and participant numbers, customer 
loyalty programs are obviously no longer in their infancy. To the 
contrary, they have hit full stride, and there is every reason to believe 
that their popularity will persist and continue to grow.
81
 
2. Mixed-Use Goods and Services 
A second recent development in fringe benefits is the provision of 
goods or services with a mixed personal/business component, such as 
smartphones (or other cell phones), cellular service, and/or internet 
service. This increasingly commonplace practice
82
 reflects both 
developments in technology and growing demands on employees to be 
available 24/7. 
Over the last two decades, the ease of communication has increased at 
a dizzying pace. For example, telephones that were once anchored to a 
particular location are no longer tethered and are usable virtually 
anywhere throughout the world.
83
 Similarly, computers that were once 
stationary and immobile have shed lots of pounds and can easily be 
carried around on one’s person.84 Finally, the internet, which until fairly 
recently did not exist, is now universally accessible.
85
 
These technological developments led to the development of a more 
demanding work environment for employees. Consider how in 
yesteryear one’s work environment and personal life were completely 
separated. When employees left the office or plant, they typically 
entered an entirely different realm of their existence. They went home, 
had dinner, perhaps watched television, read the newspaper, and/or 
attended their child’s scholastic or sporting events. From a practical 
perspective, this disconnect between an employee’s work and home 
made sense because if the office or plant were physically closed, in most 
instances, only limited communications could be had with office 
                                                     
81. See STEPHAN A. BUTSCHER, CUSTOMER LOYALTY PROGRAMMES AND CLUBS 20–28 (2002) 
(explaining the popularity of customer loyalty programs and why they flourish); ARTHUR 
MIDDLETON HUGHES, THE CUSTOMER LOYALTY SOLUTION: WHAT WORKS (AND WHAT DOESN’T) 
IN CUSTOMER LOYALTY PROGRAMS 2 (2003) (“[I]t is now possible to keep, economically, in a 
computer the kind of information on customers that the old corner grocer used to keep in his head 
and to use that to build lasting, profitable relationships with customers.”). 
82. See supra note 7. 
83. See generally GUY KLEMENS, THE CELLPHONE: THE HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE 
GADGET THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2010). 
84. See generally MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY ET AL., COMPUTER: A HISTORY OF THE 
INFORMATION MACHINE (2014). 
85. See generally JOHNNY RYAN, A HISTORY OF THE INTERNET AND THE DIGITAL FUTURE 
(2013). 
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personnel and clients. But the communications industry has had a 
transformative effect on the manner in which people presently conduct 
their business and personal lives. When people leave the office or plant 
for the day, no longer do they necessarily stop working. Instead, on their 
daily commute, many employees return business telephone calls, text 
messages, and exchange e-mail. When they are home, they often engage 
in the exact same activities; and, even when they are on vacation, people 
stay “connected” with their office.86 The erstwhile clear demarcation line 
between people’s business and personal lives has never been so blurred. 
And while communication costs have declined significantly, staying 
in touch is still far from free. The annual cost of cell phone ownership is 
in the neighborhood of $1200,
87
 and the annual cost of securing home 
internet service (which depends in large part on the speed that a user 
chooses) can run as much as $3600.
88
 For an average family, these out-
of-pocket expenses can constitute a sizable portion of their disposable 
income.
89
 When an employer alleviates this financial burden by picking 
up the tab for such costs, it is a significant job perk; when these job 
perks are not reported as taxable income, it is a serendipitous bonus. 
                                                     
86. See, e.g., Americans Stay Connected to Work on Weekends, Vacation and Even When Out 
Sick, APA.ORG (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2013/09/connected-
work.aspx [https://perma.cc/H7GL-L3AW] (“More than half of employed adults said they check 
work messages at least once a day over the weekend (53 percent), before or after work during the 
week (52 percent) and even when they are home sick (54 percent). More than 4 in 10 workers (44 
percent) reported doing the same while on vacation.”). 
87. See, e.g., Dave Smith, Cell Phone Bills Are Up 50% Since the iPhone Was Invented, BUS. 
INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-cell-phone-bills-are-up-
50-since-the-iphone-was-invented-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/KHZ2-7QDN] (“Households spent an 
average of $913 on phone bills in 2013—and a fifth of those households spent more than $1,400 
that year.”). 
88. See, e.g., Brian Fung, The Price of the Internet Is Too High, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/28/the-price-of-internet-is-too-high/ 
[http://perma.cc/33RF-KCRN] (“In American cities like New York, you can buy a 500 Mbps 
connection that’s 58 times faster than the U.S. average. Here’s the catch: It’ll cost you $300 a 
month . . . .”). On the other hand, a connection speed of only twenty-five Mbps would cost roughly 
$50 per month. See Hannah Yi, This Is How Internet Speed and Price in the U.S. Compares to the 
Rest of the World, PBS NEWSHOUR (Apr. 26, 2015, 12:54 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/ 
internet-u-s-compare-globally-hint-slower-expensive/ [https://perma.cc/P4DR-BT4M]. 
89. Anton Troianovski, Cell Phones Are Eating the Family Budget, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2012, 
3:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444083304578018731890309450 
[https://perma.cc/E92C-FGB3] (“Government data show people have spent more on phone bills 
over the past four years, even as they have dialed back on dining out, clothes and entertainment—
cutbacks that have been keenly felt in the restaurant, apparel and film industries.”). 
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3. Lifestyle Enhancements 
Over the last several decades, the nature of many workplace 
environments has shifted from work-centric to life-encompassing. With 
this evolution of the workplace has come a new breed of fringe benefits 
that serve as lifestyle enhancements, such as free massages and gourmet 
meals. An examination of the twentieth-century workplace compared to 
the workplace of today demonstrates why this shift in environment has 
occurred. 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was in the 
midst of its Industrial Revolution. At that time and for many decades 
thereafter, the workplace environment was fairly staid: employees 
commuted to work, performed their duties, and then commuted home.
90
 
In many instances, there was almost a complete separation between 
one’s work and home and the activities that transpired at each location. 
Certainly, prior to the advent of telephones, it was virtually impossible 
to have on-the-job personal communications with friends, family, and 
loved ones outside of work. Indeed, even when telephones were 
introduced into the workplace, the calls incurred charges,
91
 constituting a 
dissuasive factor in employees making personal calls. The same was true 
when employees left work: most had no home telephones, and thus there 
was virtually no way for them to stay in touch with the business 
enterprise. Even after home telephones came into vogue, making work-
related calls remained an expensive undertaking. 
But technological advancements and globalization have transformed 
the workplace. The workplace is no longer an isolated island separated 
in space and time from one’s personal life. Now, with a click of a mouse 
or push of a button on their computers or smartphones, employees can 
get instant access to their personal e-mail, as well as Facebook and other 
social media accounts, allowing them to communicate with anyone they 
wish while at work.
92
 This connectedness makes sense as workdays have 
                                                     
90. See, e.g., DONALD M. FISK, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AMERICAN LABOR IN THE 
20TH CENTURY (2001), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/american-labor-in-the-20th-century.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RB8-DVBF] (“Electricity was in less than 10 percent of the nation’s homes at the 
turn of the century, but it was almost universal by the end of the century.”); see also CAMPBELL-
KELLY ET AL., supra note 84, at 3–20 (detailing the few mechanical machines that were available in 
offices at the turn of the nineteenth century). 
91. See, e.g., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, STATISTICS OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS 
pt. 7 (1996 ed.), http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/ 
SOCC/95socc.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3XX-SWL2] (detailing the varying telephone toll costs that 
major communication carriers charged among different cities). 
92. While some employers restrict access to personal e-mail, social networking, and other 
websites on office computers, employees can generally still access these from their own personal 
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become longer and people’s daily commutes have generally increased in 
duration.
93
 Globalization is another factor that has transformed the 
workplace. With a world marketplace and twenty-four time zones, there 
is now never a time period when everything is closed. To the contrary, a 
business can stay fully operational at all times during the day because 
something is always happening somewhere, whether it be the European 
or Asian markets. To stay competitive, many employees are putting in 
longer hours.
94
 
Due to this overlap between work and personal lives, employers have 
tried to make the workplace more enticing and employee friendly. These 
efforts have perhaps made their greatest mark in Silicon Valley, where 
there has been a concerted effort to coalesce employees’ business and 
personal lives into a coherent whole. The manifestations of this 
coalescence are found at work locations that feature a wide array of 
perks seeking to transcend traditional work/personal boundaries.
95
 These 
at-work offerings include personal concierge services, housecleaning 
services, laundry machines and dry-cleaning services, haircuts, bowling 
alleys, yoga classes, and dance lessons, often staffed by outside third-
party providers.
96
 
The workplace trend set in Silicon Valley is not an isolated 
phenomenon. Throughout the country, many other businesses have 
attempted to replicate the Silicon Valley workplace model.
97
 This trend 
                                                     
devices like smartphones or tablets.  
93. See, e.g., BRIAN MCKENZIE & MELANIE RAPINO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ACS-15, 
COMMUTING IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 4 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acs-
15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YF6-7XT9] (“Figure 3 shows mean travel time since 1980, the first year 
the census collected travel-time information. The mean travel time for workers was just under 22 
minutes in 1980, then increased between 1980 and 2000 to about 25 minutes, where it remained in 
2009.”). 
94. Lydia Saad, The “40-Hour” Work Week Is Actually Longer—By Seven Hours, GALLUP (Aug. 
29, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/175286/hour-workweek-actually-longer-seven-hours.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/SL7Q-CNKS] (“Adults employed full time in the U.S. report working an average 
of 47 hours per week, almost a full workday longer than what a standard five-day, 9-to-5 schedule 
entails. In fact, half of all full-time workers indicate they typically work more than 40 hours, and 
nearly four in 10 say they work at least 50 hours.”). 
 
—By Seven Hours, GALLUP (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/175286/hour-workweek-
actually-longer-seven-hours.aspx [https://perma.cc/SL7Q-CNKS] (“Adults employed full time in 
the U.S. report working an average of 47 hours per week, almost a full workday longer than what a 
standard five-day, 9-to-5 schedule entails. In fact, half of all full-time workers indicate they 
typically work more than 40 hours, and nearly four in 10 say they work at least 50 hours.”). 
97. See, e.g., Barry Jaruzelski, Why Silicon Valley’s Success Is So Hard to Replicate, SCI. AM. 
(Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-silicon-valleys-success-is-so-hard-
to-replicate/ [https://perma.cc/Y7UP-URM6] (“To be sure, pockets of innovation have emerged on a 
smaller scale elsewhere in the U.S., like North Carolina’s Research Triangle and the Route 128 
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suggests that businesses will continue to expand existing fringe benefit 
offerings and add new perks to lure the world’s most talented workforce. 
B. Overview of the Taxation of Third-Party-Provided Fringe Benefits 
In theory, the taxation of fringe benefit receipt should be 
rudimentary. As an accretion to their wealth, taxpayers who receive 
fringe benefits from their employers should initially assume that their 
receipt constitutes taxable income.
98
 Next, they should examine 
whether the fringe benefit in question qualifies under one of eight 
exclusions to taxability found in Code section 132.
99
 If the fringe 
benefit in question does not qualify within the scope of one of these 
eight exclusions, its value must be included in gross income, unless 
another Code exclusion applies (which is rarely the case). If it does 
qualify by falling within the scope of one of these eight exclusions, its 
value is excluded from gross income. 
Applying this general framework to modern fringe benefits 
requires a close examination of the Code section 132 exclusions. 
Section 132 lists eight specific fringe benefits that are excluded from 
income: (1) no-additional-cost services, (2) qualified employee 
discounts, (3) working condition fringes, (4) de minimis fringes, (5) 
qualified transportation fringes, (6) qualified moving expense 
reimbursements, (7) qualified retirement planning services, and (8) 
qualified military base realignment and closure fringes.
100
 
The vast majority of these exclusions have no plausible 
application to the modern fringe benefits described here.
101
 Indeed, only 
two of the foregoing exclusions are possible candidates for application, 
namely, working condition fringes and de minimis fringes. 
Code section 132(d) defines “working condition fringe” as “any 
property or services provided to an employee of the employer to the 
extent that, if the employee paid for such property or services, such 
                                                     
Corridor outside Boston.”). 
98. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012). 
99. Id. § 132(a). 
100. Id. § 132(a)(1)–(8). 
101. Although perhaps not immediately apparent from their respective labels, “no-additional-cost 
services” and “qualified employee discounts” are not relevant to the types of benefits at issue in this 
analysis, which generally involve third-party providers. No-additional-cost services involve services 
that are otherwise provided in the ordinary course of the employer’s business (e.g., air travel 
provided by an airline). See id. § 132(b). Qualified employee discounts similarly involve discounts 
on goods or services provided in the ordinary course of the employer’s business (e.g., a merchandise 
discount provided to employees of the store in which the merchandise is sold). Id. § 132(c).   
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payment would be allowable as a deduction [as an ordinary and 
necessary business expense, or it would be depreciable].”102 As 
expressed in the legislative history, common examples of working 
condition fringe benefits include magazine subscriptions, personal 
bodyguards for security reasons, and on-the-job training classes.
103
 
Code section 132(e) defines “de minimis fringe” as “any property or 
service the value of which is (after taking into account the frequency 
with which similar fringes are provided by the employer to the 
employer’s employees) so small as to make accounting for it 
unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”104 Common examples 
of excludable de minimis fringe benefits include “occasional cocktail 
parties, group meals, or picnics for employees and their guests; [and] 
traditional birthday or holiday gifts of property (not cash) with low fair 
market value.”105 Common examples of benefits that would not qualify 
as de minimis fringe benefits include “season tickets to sporting or 
theatrical events; the commuting use of an employer-provided 
automobile or other vehicle more than one day a month; [and] 
membership in a private country club or athletic facility.”106 
With the foregoing analytical framework in mind, we consider 
whether Code section 132(d) (working condition fringes) or 132(e) (de 
minimis fringes) excludes from income the modern fringe benefits 
described in the prior section. 
                                                     
102. Id. § 132(d). 
103. H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 1601–02 (1984). 
104. The Treasury regulations posit two ways in which frequency should be measured. The first 
is “[e]mployee-measured frequency.” Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(1) (as amended in 1992). Under this 
test, what each individual employee receives from the employer is measured. For example, if one 
employee out of a hundred always receives lunch daily, its value is not de minimis because of the 
frequency with which lunch is received, albeit, as measured by the entire workforce, such meals are 
infrequently provided. The second frequency test is “[e]mployer-measured frequency.” Id. § 1.132-
6(b)(2). This test may only be utilized if, due to administrative tracking burdens, the “[e]mployee-
measured frequency” test is unavailable. Id.; see also Memorandum from Jerry E. Holmes, Chief, 
Emp’t Tax Branch 2, Dep’t of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv. (Dec. 31, 2001), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0219005.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CKC-B36H]. Under this second 
test, what is measured is the frequency with which an employer provides goods and/or services to its 
employees, taking into account the size of the entire workforce. Thus, if a photocopy machine is 
restricted to general business use and one employee out of a hundred frequently makes copies on his 
family’s behalf, his use would still qualify as de minimis in nature because, from the employer’s 
vantage point, there is infrequent overall employee use. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(2). 
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1). 
106. Id. § 1.132-6(e)(2). 
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1. Customer Loyalty Programs 
First, consider the nature of customer loyalty programs. These 
programs award frequent-flier miles, hotel rewards points, and rental car 
bonuses. On the one hand, if employees are mandated to use these 
program benefits to lessen future business-related expenses, such 
benefits do not constitute taxable income to employees.
107
 To illustrate, 
suppose that an employee takes four business trips to the United 
Kingdom and, by doing so, earns enough frequent-flier miles, hotel 
rewards points, and rental car bonuses so that on his next business trip to 
Paris (or anywhere else in the world) he can fly, sleep, and drive for free. 
Notwithstanding the receipt of these free benefits, there is no personal 
inurement and hence no taxable income. Put somewhat differently, these 
“free” benefits reduce the operating expenses of the business enterprise; 
and, as such, the initial four purchases combined with the fifth free trip 
constitute nothing other than a bargain purchase for the employer.
108
 
On the other hand, when employees are given free rein and can use 
customer loyalty programs for their personal benefit, a different tax 
outcome results. More specifically, suppose in the prior example that the 
employee uses the customer loyalty program to his advantage so that his 
next trip is a personal vacation for himself and his wife, where they each 
enjoy a free flight to Paris, free hotel stay while there, and the free use of 
a rental car to cruise the Champs-Élysées. None of these benefits fall 
within the exclusions found in Code section 132. In particular, they are 
not working condition fringe benefits because had the employee himself 
utilized his own funds for such expenditures, they would not have been 
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
109
 Moreover, 
due to their relatively high fair market value, the airfare, hotel, and rental 
car do not fall within the scope of de minimis fringe benefits.
110
 Since no 
fringe benefit exclusion applies, the fair market value of these benefits 
should be included in the employee’s gross income.111 
                                                     
107. See Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1 C.B. 23; JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: 
DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 71–73 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining the tax-free nature of 
“commercial bargain purchases”). 
108. See supra note 107. 
109. I.R.C. § 132(d) (2012). Amounts spent on a vacation generally would be considered 
nondeductible personal expenses. See id. § 262. 
110. Id. § 132(e). 
111. Id. § 61(a). 
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2. Mixed-Use Goods and Services 
Next, consider situations where, as part of their employment package, 
employees receive a smartphone and home internet service. From an 
employer’s perspective, this often makes incontrovertible business 
sense: at virtually all times, employees can be readily reached by the 
employer and/or clients. Conversely, employees can keep their 
employers and/or clients apprised of existing or prospective business. 
Because the costs associated with smartphone and home internet service 
use are ordinarily fixed, employers generally will be indifferent if and 
when employees use such items for their personal use. 
The question becomes thus: if an employee uses his smartphone and 
home internet service for personal use, say forty percent of the time, 
what should be the concomitant tax consequences? Had the employee 
independently secured a smartphone, the associated fees would likely 
have been at least $100 monthly, or $1200 annually.
112
 Internet access 
can range from $30 to over $300 per month, depending on the speed (up 
to $3600 annually).
113
 Because the employer bears this expense, there 
has been an accretion to the employee’s wealth and, accordingly, the 
possibility of taxable income. 
In trying to ascertain the tax consequences associated with the receipt 
of these benefits, their respective business and personal uses should be 
considered separately. Consider again the example of an employee who 
uses her employer-provided cell phone for personal purposes forty 
percent of the time and for work purposes sixty percent of the time. The 
portion of the phone expense attributable to work use (i.e., sixty percent 
of the total annual cost) should be a nontaxable working condition fringe 
benefit under section 132 because if the employee had paid for the work 
use directly, she could deduct it as a business expense.
114
 
                                                     
112. See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, Verizon Leads Top Wireless Carriers in Bill Size, at Least $148 a 
Month, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 15, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/01/verizon-leads-top-
wireless-carriers-in-bill-size-at-148-a-month [https://perma.cc/F9RK-PM9C] (explaining the 
average individual iPhone plan costs $104 per month; average for other smartphones is $94 per 
month).  
113. See NICK RUSSO ET AL., OPEN TECH. INST., THE COST OF CONNECTIVITY 2014, at 12 fig.1 
(2014), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/229-the-cost-of-connectivity-2014/OTI_The_ 
Cost_of_Connectivity_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/L745-85TW]; see also Fung, supra note 88; Yi, 
supra note 88. 
114. Generally, a taxpayer must provide some evidence showing which portion of a mixed-use 
cell phone or internet service was allocable to business activity and may take a business deduction 
for that portion. Recently, a taxpayer attempted to deduct his entire cellular phone bill for 2010 of 
$2478 despite the fact that he, his wife, and their two children were also on the plan. Kaminski v. 
Comm’r, No. 21119-13S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2015-7. He also tried to deduct his $636 internet bill that 
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As for the personal portion of the phone or internet use, there are two 
possible approaches, one of which is pro-taxpayer and the other of which 
is pro-government. Under the pro-taxpayer approach, the personal use of 
the phone and internet would constitute a de minimis fringe benefit 
because the use is occasional. The IRS has adopted this pro-taxpayer 
position in the case of certain employer-provided cell phones (but not 
internet service).
115
 Specifically, the IRS has issued guidance stating that 
it will treat the business use of the cell phone as a working condition 
fringe and the personal use as a de minimis fringe, as long the phone was 
provided for noncompensatory reasons such as ensuring that the 
employer or clients can reach the employee outside of normal work 
hours.
116
 The pro-government approach would be to argue that while the 
business use of both the telephone and internet service constitutes a 
working condition fringe benefit, their frequent personal use combined 
with their significant fair market value disqualifies them from 
constituting de minimis fringe benefits.
117
 As such, a percentage of the 
fair market value of each item equal to personal use time should be 
includable in the employee’s income.118 We explore this approach in 
depth in Part III. 
3. Lifestyle Enhancements 
Finally, consider the income tax consequences of certain on-the-job 
comforts and entertainment such as concierge services, personal 
massages, and access to dance lessons and bowling alleys. Had the 
employee made such purchases, they would not qualify as ordinary and 
necessary business expenses; and, as such, they would not qualify as 
working condition fringe benefits.
119
 Whether these sorts of fringe 
                                                     
provided home access. Id. The Commissioner allowed the taxpayer to deduct seventy-five percent 
of the internet cost and twenty-five percent of the phone bill. Id. 
Notably, cell phones are no longer subject to the substantiation requirements of Code section 
274(d), which contain more onerous recordkeeping requirements for taxpayers to deduct certain 
types of business expenses (e.g., business travel and entertainment expenses). Small Business Jobs 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 2043, 124 Stat. 2504, 2560 (removing cell phones from the 
definition of “listed property” under Code section 280F(d)(4)). 
115. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-72, 2011-36 I.R.B. 407 (allowing personal use of a cell phone to 
constitute a de minimis fringe benefit as long as the cell phone is primarily noncompensatory in 
nature). 
116. Id. On the other hand, the notice does not apply to phones offered to promote employee 
morale, attract prospective hires, or furnish additional compensation. Id. 
117. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
118. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012). 
119. See id. § 132(d). 
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benefits can qualify as de minimis is another issue. In some cases, they 
should qualify; for example, even if a company regularly offers its 
employees cappuccino instead of plain coffee, there is little doubt that 
the IRS would classify such a benefit as de minimis.
120
 In contrast, if a 
company regularly offers employees certain other benefits (e.g., haircuts, 
dance lessons, or concierge services) that are (1) valuable, (2) frequently 
utilized by particular employees, or (3) frequently utilized by a large 
segment of the employer’s employees, those benefits will not fall within 
the ambit of de minimis fringe benefits exempt from taxation.
121
 
In sum, a close examination of today’s fringe benefit offerings 
strongly suggests that the vast majority constitute gross income and that 
no exclusion exempts them from taxation. 
Admittedly, there is a line of cases in which economic benefits inure 
to taxpayers that are not specifically excluded from income under Code 
section 132 but are nevertheless deemed not taxable.
122
 For example, in 
United States v. Gotcher,
123
 an employer sent an employee on a scouting 
mission to Germany to determine whether a capital investment in a 
Volkswagen franchise was worthwhile. While in Germany, the vast 
majority of the employee’s time was apparently spent engaged in 
business (i.e., investigating the viability of the franchise purchase), but 
the employee also spent part of his trip touring the German 
countryside.
124
 The Fifth Circuit held that these touring junkets 
constituted inconsequential economic benefits and, as such, were not 
taxable, declaring that “some economic gains, though not specifically 
excluded from section 61, may nevertheless escape taxation.”125 
But the inconsequential economic benefits involved in Gotcher are 
readily distinguishable from the modern fringe benefits described in this 
Article. With respect to the benefits described in such cases, the 
marginal economic utility that the employees were able to command was 
truly an unintended by-product associated with the business objectives 
                                                     
120. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
122. See, e.g., Townsend Indus., Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that 
employer-provided fishing trip did not constitute income to employees because the primary thrust of 
the trip was business related); People’s Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1967) 
(finding that since the trip’s training aspects predominated its vacation aspects, the economic benefit 
that inured to employees did not constitute wages).  
123. 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968). 
124. See id. at 122. 
125. Id. at 124. However, Gotcher was taxed on the value of the trip expenses attributable to his 
wife, for whom “the trip was primarily a vacation.” Id. 
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that the employer in question sought to achieve.
126
 In contrast, today’s 
modern fringe benefits are, for the most part, wholly unrelated to the 
employer’s economic objectives and easily segregated therefrom. 
C. Why Modern Fringe Benefits Are Often Not Reported 
Despite the fact that modern fringe benefits (which were largely 
unknown until the turn of this century) should be subject to income 
tax,
127
 there are a number of reasons why taxpayers may fail to report 
these fringe benefits for tax purposes. Possible factors include the 
following: (1) the valuation of such fringe benefits is inherently 
problematic; (2) recordkeeping could prove administratively 
burdensome; (3) their “tax-free status” has tremendous popular and 
political support; and, (4) over the past quarter of a century, payroll taxes 
have significantly risen, making noncompliance more attractive. One or 
more of these factors likely play a pivotal role in the practice of 
taxpayers not reporting the receipt of these benefits. 
1. Problematic Valuation 
Consider first the issue of valuation. Taxable benefits are generally 
easy to quantify. If a taxpayer performs a service and is paid $1000 in 
cash, then the Code taxes the $1000 as income.
128
 Similarly, if a 
taxpayer performs the same services and is paid in-kind (e.g., with a 
television worth $1000), the Code taxes the in-kind payment as $1000 of 
income.
129
 
Much more challenging are circumstances in which payments are 
made in-kind with assets that have a fair market value that is hard or 
virtually impossible to ascertain. A case in point is frequent-flier miles. 
The fair market value of these miles depends upon a whole host of 
important factors, including the generosity of the plan itself (i.e., how 
many miles must be redeemed to secure a particular trip), the time in the 
                                                     
126. This issue is somewhat similar in nature to what are known as Kleinwächter’s conundrums, 
presented in HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 43 (1938). The most famous of these conundrums involves a 
Flügeladjutant, or military attaché, who, as a condition of his employment, must attend the theater 
and opera with the emperor. As a result of attending these entertainment events, would the 
Flügeladjutant derive income? Simons labeled the answer to this question as “clearly hopeless,” id. 
at 53, but this series of cases, see supra note 122, and Gotcher instruct taxpayers to treat the 
inconsequential economic benefits deriving from certain employment events as nontaxable.  
127. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012). 
128. Id. 
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (as amended in 2003). 
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calendar year when the benefit is redeemed, and the proximity in time to 
the scheduled flight when the reservation is made.
130
 Translated into 
dollars and cents, several studies indicate a wide disparity in the fair 
market value of frequent-flier miles: they are purportedly worth as little 
as a penny or as much as a nickel.
131
 A typical employer would not know 
how to pinpoint this value. If an employer assumed the fair market value 
of each mile to be one cent, the income of many employees might be 
undertaxed; conversely, if an employer assumed the fair market value of 
each mile to be five cents, the income of many employees would be 
overtaxed. The timing of the inclusion in income is also problematic: is 
it upon receipt of the miles, when the reservation is made, or when the 
flight is taken? 
Many of the issues regarding frequent-flier miles likewise hold true 
with respect to the other customer loyalty program benefits that this 
analysis describes (e.g., hotel rewards programs and rental car bonus 
upgrades)—in other words, ascertaining their fair market values is 
fraught with great difficulty, and timing inclusion concerns abound.
132
 
2. Burdensome Recordkeeping 
Next, consider the recordkeeping challenges associated with tracking 
the receipt of many modern fringe benefits. By way of background, 
consider the fact that the Treasury regulations generally do not require 
that taxpayers track the receipt of de minimis fringe benefits if the 
burdens of tracking such benefits outweigh their projected revenue.
133
 
The quintessential example of such a de minimis fringe benefit is 
attendance at an occasional employer-provided cocktail party; no one 
realistically expects that the bartender should record each drink that an 
employee orders and, at the end of the event, issue a drink-tally report to 
the employer or the employee. The revenue associated with taxing these 
drinks would not be worth the administrative recordkeeping burden. 
                                                     
130. See infra notes 150–60 and accompanying text. 
131. Ed Perkins, Frequent Flyer Miles: A Close Look, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 6, 2013), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-06/lifestyle/sns-201308060000—tms—travelpkctnxf-
a20130806-20130806_1_1-8-cents-award-seats-premium-seats [https://perma.cc/Z5ZY-HAT9]. 
132. Consider hotel points, which are frequently subject to restrictions not unlike those applicable 
to airline miles. For example, the type of room or upgrade that can be purchased with a certain 
amount of points may vary based on availability at the time of purchase, or the time of the year. See, 
e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, HILTON HHONORS, http://hhonors3.hilton.com/en/support/faq/ 
index.html#hotelrewards [https://perma.cc/YWP6-SW9U] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (discussing 
restrictions applicable to Hilton hotel points). 
133. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(c) (as amended in 1992). 
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Such administrative challenges hold true with respect to many other 
fringe benefits as well. For example, with respect to employees who use 
their employer-provided cell phones and home internet service for 
personal use, it would be intrusive for employers to monitor and 
burdensome to employees to record such usage. 
3. Political Support for Tax-Free Status 
Today’s fringe benefits also garner tremendous popular and political 
support. Such benefits have become ubiquitous and deeply entrenched as 
an essential feature of the nation’s economic fabric. 
Consider a recent case in point. As a marketing ploy, Citibank offered 
potential customers frequent-flier miles if they opened up new deposit 
accounts.
134
 Those taxpayers who, on the basis of this offer, opened bank 
accounts and received frequent-flier miles were surprised to learn that 
Citibank treated the frequent-flier miles, valued at 2.5 cents per mile, as 
a form of taxable interest and reported it on each customer’s annual 
Form 1099.
135
 This tax treatment created a firestorm of controversy as 
politicians from both sides of the political aisle rushed to denounce 
Citibank’s tax treatment of such miles,136 even though Citibank was on 
sound statutory footing.
137
 
The Citibank uproar is not an isolated incident.
138
 On many occasions, 
popular and political support for the current tax treatment of third-party-
provided fringe benefits has been quite vocal.
139
 
                                                     
134. Martha C. White, Income Taxes on Frequent Flyer Miles?!, TIME (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://business.time.com/2012/01/30/citi-customers-learn-bonus-airline-miles-have-a-high-price/ 
[https://perma.cc/G83R-NLPR]. 
135. Id. 
136. See, e.g., Alistair M. Nevius, Are Frequent Flyer Miles Taxable?, J. ACCT. (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2012/Aug/20125796.htm [https://perma.cc/F5HE-
HVCJ] (“Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio, wrote Citibank to reprimand it and ask it to discontinue the 
practice.”). 
137. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012). 
138. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Zelenak & Martin J. McMahon Jr., Taxing Baseballs and Other 
Found Property, 84 TAX NOTES 1299, 1299–300 (1999) (explaining why many politicians, 
reflecting public sentiment, made it clear that record-breaking home-run baseballs should not be 
taxed).  
A more cynical reason why many politicians are such staunch defenders of retaining the tax-free 
status of third-party fringe benefits is that the recipients of such benefits are well-to-do 
economically and have used their bountiful financial resources to lobby politicians on their behalf. 
See Edward J. McCaffery & Linda Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective 
Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (2006) (explaining how politicians use the threat of taxes to attract 
campaign funds). 
139. See, e.g., JP Mangalindan, A Tax on Free Meals? Silicon Valley Says ‘Bad Idea,’ FORTUNE 
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This popular and political support has engendered an environment in 
which taxpayers—both employers and employees—exist in self-imposed 
ignorance regarding the dispensing and receipt of fringe benefits. 
Employers who do not report these kinds of fringe benefits understand 
that this is not an issue that IRS auditors generally raise,
140
 and many 
employees subscribe to the notion that they must report only what is on 
their Form W-2. The combination of the employer’s mentality that “the 
less it tells, the better” and the employees’ mentality that “the less they 
know, the better” has left a vast void when it comes to the reporting of 
these fringe benefits. 
4. Increased Payroll Taxes 
Finally, over the last several years, payroll taxes have become more 
burdensome. The two most significant payroll increases were in 1993 
and 2010. In 1993, Congress passed legislation that removed the wage 
cap associated with the application of the 2.9% Medicare tax
141
 so that 
all wages are now subject to this payroll tax. More recently, as part of 
the Affordable Care Act, so-called high-income workers pay an 
additional Medicare tax equal to 0.9% of earnings above certain 
unindexed thresholds: $200,000 for single taxpayers and $250,000 for 
the combined earnings of married taxpayers.
142
 Offering tax-free fringe 
benefits mitigates the burdens of these increased payroll taxes and 
thereby enhances their attractiveness. 
D. The Current Landscape 
The reasons for taxpayer noncompliance are, quite obviously, 
plentiful, which bodes poorly for a tax system that historically relies 
                                                     
(Sept. 2, 2014, 8:25 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/02/a-tax-on-free-meals-silicon-valley-reacts/ 
[https://perma.cc/3CE3-VWV8] (“News of a potential tax on free meals has many worried in 
Silicon Valley, where all-you-can eat buffets are a basic recruiting tool.”). 
140. IRS agents harbor a self-interest in not aggressively pursuing taxpayers who receive 
promotional benefits and treating them as taxable income since the Internal Revenue Manual 
specifically states the following: “Counsel employees may retain for personal use promotional items 
received during the course of an official business trip if such items are obtained under the same 
conditions as those offered to the general public at no additional cost to the Government.” 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL ¶ 30.5.2.6 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/ 
irm/part30/irm_30-005-002.html#d0e620 [https://perma.cc/37P7-2PEL]. 
141. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13207, 107 Stat. 312, 
467–68. 
142. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9015, 124 Stat. 119, 
870–71 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, § 1411, 124 Stat. 1029, 1061–63 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (2012)). 
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heavily upon accurate taxpayer self-reporting. Thus, it is important to 
explore those avenues of reform that Congress should consider in order 
to bolster taxpayer compliance. 
For many reasons, reforming this area of the law is challenging. For 
years, taxpayers have become acclimated to not paying taxes on many 
fringe benefits. They and the politicians that represent them are thus 
unlikely to readily concede that such benefits are taxable; indeed, they 
will likely argue that many hurdles, such as valuation and administrative 
recordkeeping, make the taxation of such benefits impossible. This is not 
a problem that is unique to the United States, either. Other industrial 
countries that rely upon income tax systems for revenue are 
encountering the same difficult issue of trying to tax third-party-
provided fringe benefits, and, to date, no such nation has developed an 
approach that puts this issue to rest; instead, each appears to endure this 
problem in its own stoic fashion.
143
 
For the time being, the IRS has responded to some, though not all, of 
these issues in an ad hoc fashion. With respect to frequent-flier miles 
and similar promotional benefits earned through business travel, the IRS 
has declared that, in the absence of congressional direction, it will not 
take any enforcement action against taxpayers who use these benefits for 
personal purposes.
144
 The IRS has also taken the position that personal 
use of cell phones provided by employers primarily for business 
purposes constitutes a de minimis fringe.
145
 Finally, though the IRS has 
remained silent on the issue of lifestyle enhancements to date, the 
Treasury and the IRS have put “[g]uidance under [sections] 119 and 132 
regarding employer-provided meals” on their 2014–2015 Priority 
Guidance Plan.
146
 
That the IRS has staked out a position with respect to any of these 
benefits should leave elected officials from both sides of the political 
aisle uneasy. On the right, politicians should be aghast that an unelected 
administrative agency—particularly one that they detest147—has been 
                                                     
143. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Up in the Air over Frequent Flyer Benefits: The American, 
Canadian, and Australian Experiences, 9 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 420, 421 (2014) (“Virtually no 
tax on frequent flyer benefits is collected anywhere, and respect for the rule of law . . . has been 
eroded.”). 
144. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621. 
145. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-72, 2011-36 I.R.B. 407. 
146. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2014–2015 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN 10 (2015), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2014-2015_pgp_3rd_quarter_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZDL-
8N6D].  
147. See, e.g., Doyle McManus, Republicans Love to Hate the IRS, but It’s a Model of Efficiency, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0401-mcmanus-irs-
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tacitly permitted to establish de facto law. On the left, politicians should 
be aghast that billions of dollars of fringe benefits, inuring 
predominantly to the wealthy,
148
 escape any taxation. 
III. FRINGE BENEFIT TAX REFORM 
The solution to fringe benefit tax reform lies in congressional 
attention to this matter. This Part looks first at guiding principles that 
should assist Congress in formulating reform measures and, second, at 
the application of these principles to the specific categories of modern 
fringe benefits discussed herein: customer loyalty programs, mixed-use 
assets, and lifestyle enhancements. 
A. Guiding Principles 
Before discussing potential approaches to taxing specific fringe 
benefits, we consider the following guiding principles for reform. 
1. Valuation 
First, consider valuation. When valuing fringe benefits is 
administratively burdensome and little tax revenue is at stake, such 
benefits should be excluded from employees’ income. In those 
circumstances, the cost to either the employer or the employee of having 
to value the benefit, along with additional administrative cost to the IRS 
of enforcing proper valuation, likely outweighs any financial benefit to 
the government. 
But difficult valuation alone does not justify exempting fringe 
benefits from taxation, particularly when there is significant tax revenue 
at stake. In such cases, policymakers should require income inclusion 
and rely on proxy values or formulas that would be simple and efficient 
to administer. Political or fairness concerns about inaccuracy can be 
                                                     
20150401-column.html [https://perma.cc/QYX8-SUBW]. 
148. See, e.g., Frances Dinkelspiel, With High-End Meal Perks, Facebook Keeps Up Valley 
Tradition, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/25/us/25sfcafeteria.html? 
pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/66M8-DDB8] (“On one day, the menu may feature Thai-spiced 
cilantro chicken or salmon with red curry sauce. On another, there may be roasted quail, a variety of 
chocolate-infused treats or the signature dishes of some of the top chefs of New York.”); Rachel 
Feintzeig, Lavish Perks Spawn New Job Category, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/lavish-perks-spawn-new-job-category-1416529198 [https://perma.cc/ 
VZN2-HYMD] (“Asana spends tens of thousands of dollars a year per employee on perks, which 
[the company’s chief operating officer] says is ‘easily’ equivalent to between 10% and 15% of 
salaries. [Pinterest] . . . says it spends $10 to $12 for each employee lunch or dinner—and $10 a 
person for the once-a-week hot breakfast.”). 
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addressed by choosing proxies or formulas that err toward being 
taxpayer friendly. For example, as discussed below, frequent-flyer miles 
should be valued at a fixed amount per mile based on a low-end estimate 
of their fair market value. Although adopting taxpayer-friendly valuation 
rules may leave tax revenue on the table, it is far preferable to exempting 
hard-to-value fringes from tax, which not only collects zero revenue but 
also reinforces the faulty perception that noncash compensation is free 
from tax. The Code taxes hard-to-value property and services in other 
contexts,
149
 and valuable fringe benefits should not be an exception. 
2. Recordkeeping 
Next, consider the recordkeeping challenges associated with the 
receipt of some fringe benefits. Certain goods or services may be 
relatively easy to value but difficult to track. This is particularly true of 
benefits with a mixed business/personal element. For example, although 
the value of cell phone service provided by a third party is not difficult 
to ascertain, tracking an employee’s business versus personal use of the 
phone may be difficult. Like valuation, the cost of arduous 
recordkeeping may outweigh the benefit of taxing certain benefits if 
little tax revenue is at stake. However, for fringe benefits that represent 
significant compensation to employees, recordkeeping challenges do not 
justify exempting such benefits from tax. In many instances, these 
challenges can be overcome by relying on fixed allocations between 
business and personal benefits in lieu of tracking employees’ actual 
personal consumption. For example, as discussed below, fifty percent of 
the value of an employer-provided cell phone could be taxed to 
employees as compensation.
150
 
Consider further the fact that certain other fringe benefits may be 
difficult to track on an employee-by-employee basis, yet the employer’s 
collective costs may be relatively simple to track. For example, an 
employer might provide free on-site yoga classes on a weekly basis for 
any employee who wishes to participate. While keeping track of which 
employees attend yoga week-to-week would be somewhat burdensome, 
tracking the employer’s costs for hiring a yoga teacher and providing 
facilities would be comparatively simple. In such circumstances, 
denying an employer deduction for costs is preferable to taxing 
                                                     
149. For example, regulations under section 482 of the Code provide extensive rules for valuing 
intangible property transferred between certain related parties. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4 (as 
amended in 2011).  
150. See infra Section III.C. 
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employees on the benefit.
151
 
3. Public Perception/Politics 
Another consideration is public perception and politics. While any 
attempt to tax fringe benefits that have been largely ignored until now 
will be met with marginal resistance, some reforms may be more or less 
popular than others. Taxation of benefits that are generally not perceived 
to be income by taxpayers, or benefits that taxpayers are unable to opt 
out of, will be particularly unpopular. In cases where taxing employees 
on certain fringe benefits would be particularly unpalatable, 
policymakers should consider denying employer deductions instead. 
4. Information Returns 
Finally, in those instances where taxation is warranted and in order to 
bolster compliance, we contend that Congress should require 
information returns to be provided to fringe benefit recipients. For 
benefits offered directly by employers, current withholding and 
information-reporting requirements for wages should apply; in the case 
of fringe benefits provided by third parties, Congress should require 
information reporting by those third parties if they are in the best 
position to track and disseminate information regarding the benefits. 
Applying the foregoing principles and using our prior 
categorizations
152—customer loyalty programs, mixed-use goods and 
services, and workplace lifestyle enhancements—we explore the 
appropriate tax consequences associated with the receipt of each fringe 
benefit. Depending upon the nature of the benefit being dispensed, we 
determine that they should be (1) included in employee income, (2) 
excluded from employee income, or (3) excluded from employee income 
coupled with a denial of a deduction for the employer. 
B. Taxing Customer Loyalty Program Benefits 
Customer loyalty programs generally should result in their 
                                                     
151. There is, of course, a potential accuracy trade-off that comes with denying an employer 
deduction as opposed to taxing benefits at fair market value. For example, employers with net 
operating losses or very low effective tax rates would experience little or no impact from losing a 
deduction, and there would be little or no associated revenue gain. However, in cases where 
tracking employer costs is significantly easier than tracking employee benefits, or where taxing 
employees would be politically impracticable, this potential trade-off can be justified. 
152. See supra Section II.A. 
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participants accruing taxable income
153
 when, as is commonly the case, 
the benefits are earned in the business context and subsequently utilized 
for unrelated personal consumption. Customer loyalty points should be 
valued based on a fixed amount per point and included in income at the 
time that they are redeemed for personal consumption. 
We draw this conclusion for several reasons. First, as discussed above 
in Part III, customer rewards earned from business travel and redeemed 
for personal use clearly constitute gross income to the employee under 
the tax law.
154
 For example, an employee who earns frequent-flier miles 
through business travel paid for by her employer, and who later uses 
those miles to take a vacation to Hawaii, has clearly realized an 
accession to wealth.
155
 Second, in considering the three options 
discussed above (exclude from income, include in income, or deny 
employer deduction), income inclusion is most appropriate in this 
context. Recordkeeping costs are minimal because airlines, hotels, and 
other similar third parties already keep electronic records of customer 
loyalty points. Additionally, the revenue at stake is substantial;
156
 thus, 
there is little justification here for an exclusion from income. Finally, 
employers do not incur additional out-of-pocket costs
157
 for customer 
loyalty points that their employees accrue, so denying a deduction that 
would represent the cost of the benefit is not a viable option. 
The biggest challenges presented by customer loyalty programs are 
valuation and timing. Consider again the example of an employee who 
redeems frequent-flier miles earned through business travel for a flight 
to Alabama. To tax her on the benefit received, policymakers must 
determine how to value the benefit and when to require the income 
inclusion. As to valuation, the “correct” result under the tax law would 
be to tax the employee on the fair market value of the airline ticket that 
she purchased with her frequent-flier miles.
158
 However, determining 
                                                     
153. An exception is office supply coupons, which should be excluded from taxation, as 
discussed further below. 
154. On the other hand, redeeming points earned through personal travel paid for by the taxpayer 
would not result in taxable income. See supra note 68. 
155. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
156. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Zelenak estimates forgone revenue from not 
taxing frequent-flier benefits to be in the range of $1.5 billion per year. Zelenak, supra note 143, at 
2.  
157. It is possible that the value of customer loyalty points is built into the price of the services 
that generate those points, but determining what portion of that value is assignable to the points is 
impractical. Generally, the market price of a service with or without customer loyalty membership 
is the same.  
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (as amended in 2003). 
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this fair market value may be difficult with respect to an individual ticket 
and, even if this fair market value could be determined with reasonable 
accuracy, adopting a case-by-case valuation would be administratively 
costly. 
One option that would attempt to approximate fair market valuation 
of frequent-flier miles would be to tax the employee on an amount equal 
to the cost of a comparable airline ticket purchased for cash, i.e., a ticket 
on the same flight that is in the same class (economy versus business, for 
example) and that is subject to the same restrictions.
159
 In theory, an 
airline might be able to provide this value with relative ease using a 
computer program. However, it is likely that, in most cases, comparable 
tickets do not exist
160
: tickets purchased with frequent-flier miles tend to 
be subject to more restrictions than tickets purchased for cash, and 
tickets with more restrictions are generally cheaper than unrestricted 
tickets or tickets with fewer restrictions.
161
 Thus, even the most heavily 
discounted economy fare is likely worth more than an economy class 
ticket purchased with frequent-flier miles. Additionally, even if airlines 
could provide the value of a comparable ticket relatively simply, the 
process of having to value rewards points on a flight-by-flight basis 
might be too burdensome to justify the cost. 
Treasury regulations applicable to airline employees suggest another 
approach to valuing “free” flights.162 Under the relevant rules, airline 
                                                     
159. A comparable approach was taken by the Tax Court of Canada in Mommersteeg v. The 
Queen, 96 D.T.C. 1011 (1995). See also Zelenak, supra note 143, at 428–29 (discussing 
Mommersteeg). In Mommersteeg, the taxpayers had used frequent-flier miles earned through 
business travel to purchase airline tickets. 96 D.T.C. at 1011–12. The court held that, ideally, the 
“reward tickets” should be valued at the price of a ticket on the same flight in the same class and 
subject to the same restrictions. Id. at 1016. However, the reward tickets on the relevant flights were 
heavily restricted, while first and business class tickets purchased for cash were unrestricted. Id. at 
1016–17. Thus, the court discounted the amount includable in income, holding that “the value of a 
reward ticket in either business or first class is equal to that proportion of an unrestricted business or 
first class fare which the price of the most heavily discounted economy class fare on that flight is of 
the price of a full fare economy class ticket.” Id. at 1017. Zelenak notes that the Canadian Revenue 
Agency has generally not made any attempt to enforce the taxability of frequent-flier miles 
subsequent to the decision in Mommersteeg. Zelenak, supra note 143, at 429 (“Despite the 
[Canadian Revenue Authority’s (CRA)] judicial victory, there is no indication that the CRA is 
making any meaningful attempt to enforce the taxability of frequent flyer rewards.”). 
160. See Mommersteeg, 96 D.T.C. at 1014; George Guttman, IRS Moves Slowly on Frequent 
Flyer Issue, 38 TAX NOTES 1309, 1312 (1988); Zelenak, supra note 143, at 429. 
161. See, e.g., Mommersteeg, 96 D.T.C. at 1014 (“Restrictions may relate to the time when the 
ticket must be issued, flexibility of travel, for example, advance booking requirements and the 
ability to change the itinerary, the availability of refund if a ticket is not used, length of stay at 
destination and season in which travel is to take place. A major restriction relates to the number of 
tickets made available at each price level.”). 
162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(h) (as amended in 2012). 
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employees who fly standby (free of charge) on certain commercial 
flights are taxed on twenty-five percent of the airline’s highest 
unrestricted coach fare for that flight.
163
 It is unclear how this approach 
to valuation would relate to an ideal fair market value for a ticket 
purchased with frequent-flier miles.
164
 On the one hand, limiting the 
valuation to twenty-five percent of the coach fare may result in 
undervaluation. On the other hand, basing the calculation on an 
unrestricted fare might overvalue a highly restricted ticket purchased 
with frequent-flier miles, even with the seventy-five percent discount. In 
any case, application of this Treasury rule (which generally applies in 
very limited circumstances)
165
 requires the administratively burdensome 
task of determining the highest unrestricted coach fare for each relevant 
flight. 
A far better approach is to simply place a flat dollar value on each 
“mile” or “point” earned through a customer loyalty program. For 
example, each frequent-flier mile might be valued at one cent initially
166
 
and adjusted periodically for inflation.
167
 Customer loyalty points for 
other types of programs like hotels or rental cars could be valued in a 
similar manner. While no single value would accurately capture the fair 
market value of each kind of benefit, the simplicity of choosing a flat 
amount justifies such an approach. To avoid fairness concerns 
surrounding overtaxing employees, policymakers should choose an 
amount on the low-end of the estimated value range. Thus, one cent per 
mile would likely undervalue many frequent-flier benefits, which have 
                                                     
163. Id. § 1.61-21(h)(1). 
164. Id. The amount is includable on the date that the flight is taken. Id. § 1.61-21(h)(4).  
165. Standby flights offered by airlines to their employees are generally excludable fringe 
benefits under section 132 as long as the benefit qualifies as a “no-additional-cost service” (e.g., the 
flight was not otherwise full and thus there is no forgone revenue). See BLOOMBERG BNA, TAX 
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS: EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS, NO. 394-5TH, at A-23. The valuation 
rule under Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(h) generally applies to no-additional-cost services offered to airline 
employees by an airline other than the employee’s employer, which otherwise would not qualify 
under section 132. Id. at A-68.  
166. Zelenak suggests a valuation in the range of $0.008 to $0.010 per mile. See Zelenak, supra 
note 143, at 441. The valuation of frequent-flier miles may reach new levels of obscurity. See Ron 
Lieber, Guesswork in Cashing in Delta’s Frequent-Flier Miles, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/your-money/in-deltas-frequent-flier-magic-trick-not-just-
rabbits-disappear.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/U4ZA-59RG] (explaining how the number of miles 
needed for a free ticket or upgrade under Delta’s reengineered rewards program “will change based 
on destination, demand and other considerations”).  
167. Like tax bracket dollar thresholds and the amount of the personal exemption and standard 
deduction, valuations could be adjusted annually via the Treasury and the IRS rather than through 
the legislative process. 
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been estimated to be valued between one and six cents per mile,
168
 but 
such a valuation would still generate revenue—and in a politically 
palatable way. In addition to revenue generation, taxing rewards points 
at even a minimal value could go a long way toward restoring IRS 
credibility and promoting taxpayer compliance. 
As for the timing of the income inclusion, there is a theoretical case to 
be made for taxing employees upon the receipt of the miles or points. A 
taxpayer who has earned points or miles redeemable for valuable 
benefits has arguably satisfied all the tests for income inclusion under 
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
169
 i.e., an accession to wealth that 
is clearly realized, over which the taxpayer has complete dominion.
170
 
On the other hand, rewards points like frequent-flier miles are generally 
subject to contractual limitations that may point toward no income 
realization event before they are actually redeemed.
171
 In any event, it is 
likely that taxpayers generally do not perceive that they have received a 
benefit from the accrual of customer loyalty points until those points are 
redeemed. For many individuals, points or miles may expire before they 
are used. For others, restrictions on flights like blackout dates may make 
miles practicably unusable, while other employees may have no desire to 
use points earned through business travel for personal purposes. 
However, when a customer redeems miles or points in exchange for 
something of value (an airline ticket, for example), the benefit to the 
taxpayer is clear. To avoid perceptions of unfairness and political 
backlash, policymakers should establish that customer loyalty points are 
includable in income at the time that they are redeemed. 
Taxing rewards points at a flat dollar amount upon redemption would 
present some logistical hurdles, but these hurdles are not 
insurmountable. Consider again the case of frequent-flier miles, and 
assume, for example, that an employee earned 50,000 miles through 
work trips paid for by her employer. Further assume that she earned 
20,000 miles on personal trips that she paid for herself, bringing her total 
frequent-flier miles to 70,000. If the employee redeems 30,000 miles to 
purchase a round-trip coach ticket to Hawaii for vacation, who should be 
responsible for tracking miles that she accrues on business trips? 
Furthermore, how should those miles be tracked? 
                                                     
168. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.  
169. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
170. Id. at 477. 
171. For example, Zelenak notes that airlines’ frequent-flier programs typically contain terms and 
conditions that allow the airline to change or revoke benefits without notice. See Zelenak, supra 
note 143, at 437. 
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Among the employee, her employer, and the airline, the airline is in 
the best position by far to track the frequent-flier miles. As part of its 
rewards program, airlines already have the capacity to electronically 
track miles accrued for each customer, and, thus, no significant 
additional costs would be incurred. As for employers, they lack the 
necessary information regarding taxpayers’ customer rewards 
accounts.
172
 And while the taxpayers themselves are privy to the 
necessary information and could keep their own records, compliance is 
demonstrably lower when there is no third-party reporting.
173
 
Accordingly, the airlines themselves are the best choice to ensure tax 
compliance.
174
 
Assuming that airlines (or the corresponding rewards provider) would 
be responsible for tracking taxable miles, separating business and 
personal miles could be accomplished by requiring customers to 
indicate, for each trip booked, whether the travel was for “business” or 
“personal” reasons. For example, when a customer books a flight online 
using the airline’s website, he generally is prompted to enter his 
frequent-flier number. He could be similarly prompted to make one 
additional entry by checking a box or choosing from a pull-down menu 
to indicate whether the trip was business or personal in nature. 
Once miles were separated into personal and business accounts, there 
would need to be a system for allocating miles redeemed for trips. For 
the same reasons that policymakers should choose a low valuation for 
taxing frequent-flier miles, they might similarly adopt a taxpayer-
friendly approach of allowing personal miles to be applied toward 
redemption before business miles. In the example above, this would 
mean that our employee would be treated as having redeemed 20,000 
personal miles and 10,000 business miles for her ticket to Hawaii. 
Accordingly, she would be taxed on $100 of income (10,000 x $0.01). 
Airlines could then send to taxpayers annual statements on Form 1099 
                                                     
172. See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 160, at 1313. 
173. See, e.g., Karen Setze, Taxpayers Honest When Someone’s Checking, Say IRS Officials, 111 
TAX NOTES 1216, 1216 (2006) (“[R]esults from the recently completed individual reporting 
compliance study for 2001 . . . showed that only 1.2 percent of wage income was underreported, 57 
percent of nonfarm proprietor income was misreported . . . and 72 percent of farm income was 
misreported.”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006: OVERVIEW, at chart 1 
(2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/EHL7-
V3KV] (estimating one percent noncompliance rate when income is subject to substantial 
information reporting and withholding, and eight percent noncompliance rate when income is 
subject to substantial information reporting but not withholding). 
174. See Joseph M. Dodge, How to Tax Frequent Flyer Bonuses, 48 TAX NOTES 1301, 1302–03 
(1990) (proposing that airlines send taxpayers information returns with aggregate numbers (e.g., 
total award miles used) with the burden on taxpayers to calculate taxable income). 
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reporting how many business miles had been redeemed during the year 
and the corresponding amount of taxable income.
175
 
Although a shift in the status quo with respect to taxing customer 
loyalty programs may be met with some resistance initially, taxpayers 
will still recognize savings from rewards points, and it is highly unlikely 
that the tax paid would be greater than the amount at which they value 
the benefit. In the above example, the employee taxpayer recognizes 
$100 of income upon redemption of miles for a ticket to Hawaii. 
Assuming that her marginal tax rate is thirty percent, her cost for the 
ticket is now $30 (instead of zero), which is likely still significantly less 
expensive than the amount for which she could purchase a flight for 
cash. And if cash prices for a flight somehow dropped below the 
employee’s “cost”176 of a taxed flight, she could opt to pay cash instead 
of using frequent-flier miles. This is the same calculus that many 
individuals undoubtedly make when deciding whether to purchase 
relatively cheap flights for cash instead of using frequent-flier miles 
under the current system. 
Another issue that is somewhat unique to customer loyalty programs 
concerns withholding and payroll taxes. Under current law, employers 
are generally subject to withholding and payroll tax obligations on 
taxable fringe benefits.
177
 The issue with these benefits, of course, is that 
the remuneration arguably does not come from the employer but, rather, 
from the third party. This makes it somewhat unclear whether these 
benefits actually constitute “wages” for withholding and payroll tax 
purposes.
178
 Employers have a lot at stake if they fail to account 
                                                     
175. See Guttman, supra note 160, at 1313 (noting that the IRS has taken the position that it has 
authority to require airlines to file information reports if the value of the award is at least $600); 
Zelenak, supra note 143, at 444 (arguing that Code section 6041(a) authorizes a requirement for 
airlines to report frequent-flier miles to taxpayers).  
Under current law, information reporting obligations generally are not triggered for payments 
under $600 (except as otherwise provided by statute). I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2012). Thus, airlines would 
not have to report taxable business miles that resulted in less than $600 of income. If a low 
valuation per mile is adopted along with a rule that lets taxpayers use personal miles first, this could 
effectively exempt a significant number of flights from reporting (as well as exempting other 
customer loyalty benefits). Accordingly, policymakers should consider instituting a lower reporting 
threshold for third-party-provided fringe benefits, as it has done for other types of income. See, e.g., 
id. § 6049(a) (setting a $10 threshold for interest payments).  
176. The cost to the taxpayer would be the cost per mile (e.g., one cent) multiplied by business 
miles redeemed multiplied by the employee’s marginal tax rate. 
177. Employer withholding and payroll tax obligations extend to “wages,” defined as all 
remuneration for services “including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in 
any medium other than cash.” I.R.C. §§ 3401(a), 3501(b) (withholding); see also id. §§ 3121(a), 
3306(b) (Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and Federal Unemployment Tax Act). 
178. Commentators have come out both ways on this issue. Compare Dodge, supra note 174, at 
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accurately for the associated tax consequences. A multilevel set of 
penalties applies when there is a withholding failure,
179
 and another set 
of penalties applies if accurate information returns are not issued.
180
 
Thus, any legislative action that clarifies the taxability of customer 
rewards benefits should similarly clarify employer obligations in this 
regard. 
As discussed above, employers lack the requisite information 
regarding customer loyalty programs to engage in information reporting 
or withholding.
181
 Although policymakers could impose a requirement 
that taxpayers keep their employers informed of business-related 
rewards, this would be costly
182
 and likely subject to abuse.
183
 A better 
option would be to treat taxable customer loyalty program points like 
interest or dividends—amounts that are subject to information reporting 
but not withholding or payroll taxes. In this case, the information 
reporting would come from the airlines (or a similar third-party service 
provider), and the employers would essentially be left out of the 
equation. Thus, taxpayers would report and pay income tax on amounts 
reported to them on a Form 1099 by the airline or other relevant third 
party. Although there would be some revenue lost to the fisc in the form 
of forgone payroll taxes, this may be a worthy sacrifice to the goal of 
administrative feasibility.
184
 Furthermore, information reporting alone, 
without withholding, appears to be sufficient to motivate compliance for 
                                                     
1304 (concluding that frequent-flier miles are not wages because “the benefit comes from the 
airline, not the employer, and is not earned as compensation for services provided to the 
employer”), with Zelenak, supra note 143, at 442 (arguing that airline miles constitute wages 
because the employer pays for the travel giving rise to the miles and has “the power either to require 
employees to use their points only on business travel or to prohibit employees from seeking to 
receive points for employer-paid travel”). 
179. Employers that are derelict in their responsibilities to withhold bear the following possible 
consequences: secondary liability for failure to withhold income taxes, I.R.C. § 3403; secondary 
liability for failure to withhold the employee’s share of FICA taxes, id. § 3102(b); liability for late 
deposits on withheld taxes, id. § 6656(a); and liability for accuracy-related penalties, id. § 6662. 
180. See id. §§ 6721, 6722. 
181. See Dodge, supra note 174. 
182. Requiring employees to track rewards earned from business travel and report them to the 
employers would be a time-consuming exercise that would largely negate the benefit of shifting 
information-reporting responsibilities to the airlines. 
183. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 143, at 443. 
184. Certainly, some amount of horizontal equity would be compromised as well because income 
earned in the form of customer loyalty points would not be subject to payroll taxes while cash 
income (and other fringe benefits) would. However, in the case of highly paid employees, payroll 
taxes make up only a minor percentage of total taxes paid, so imposing income tax on third-party-
provided fringe benefits would still go a long way toward imposing a fairer system.  
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the vast majority of taxpayers,
185
 so the lack of withholding should not 
have any significant negative effect on overall compliance. 
While the foregoing discussion has focused largely on frequent-
flier miles, other similar types of customer loyalty programs like hotel 
and rental car programs should be taxed in the same manner. Benefits 
from those programs involve the same valuation difficulties, particularly 
because redeeming hotel or car rental points may also be subject to 
restrictions, making the cash price for a comparable service hard if not 
impossible to identify. Thus, a low-end fixed value should be assigned to 
each point, and taxpayers should be taxed upon redemption. Like 
airlines, providers of other, similar benefits should be required to issue 
information returns. 
Office supply coupons, on the other hand, should be taxed differently 
than other types of customer rewards programs. Admittedly, these store 
coupons typically delineate a specific dollar amount and, thus, do not 
present nettlesome valuation difficulties. For example, if an employee 
purchases $100 of office supplies (for which she is reimbursed by her 
employer) at Staples, she might receive a $10 coupon toward her next 
Staples purchase. However, while companies like Staples may keep 
track of cash rewards through online customer accounts,
186
 delineating 
between business and personal purchases in this context would be 
inherently problematic, particularly since those rewards are far more 
likely to be redeemed by customers in person. In the context of an in-
store purchase, tracking the redemption of those coupons, separating 
business versus personal coupons, and reporting tax information to 
customers is a much more complicated task than tracking frequent-flier 
miles and redemption of customer loyalty points of similar businesses, 
which in most cases is done online. Further, having a store clerk 
ascertain whether a taxpayer’s purchase of a desk chair using a rewards 
coupon is for personal or business use would be ridiculous; and relying 
upon a taxpayer’s self-serving assessment in this context may result in a 
highly suspect judgment call. In light of these administrative difficulties, 
we concede that office supply coupons (and other, similar cash coupon 
programs) earned through business purchases should be exempt from 
taxation for employees who redeem them for personal use. Since the 
benefits of these purchases do not fall within the scope of any of the 
                                                     
185. While the noncompliance rate for income subject to both information reporting and 
withholding is one percent, the rate for income that is subject to substantial information reporting 
only (and not withholding) is just eight percent, indicating that the vast majority of such income is 
reported accurately. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 173, chart 1. 
186. See Staples Rewards Program, supra note 77. 
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statutory exclusions in section 132 of the Code,
187
 however, 
congressional action is needed here to establish such an exemption.
188
 
Although, for reasons of administrative convenience, employees 
should not be taxed on the receipt of office supply coupons that they 
may use to make purchases that are personal in nature, we recommend 
that employers’ deductions for office supply expenses that generate 
personal-use coupons for employees be limited. More specifically, we 
propose that the employer deduction for office supplies or similar 
purchases be limited by a small amount, such as ninety-five percent of 
the cost, whenever such expenditures generate rewards coupons 
redeemable for personal use by employees.
189
 For example, if an 
employee were to purchase $100 of office supplies at Staples with a 
corporate credit card and were to earn a $10 coupon that he could use for 
any purpose he wished, his employer would be allowed to deduct only 
$95 for the office supplies. Denying a portion of the employer’s 
deduction effectively imposes a small surrogate tax on the employer for 
the benefit inuring to the employee.
190
 
Employers who wish to deduct 100% of the cost should be able to 
“opt out” by eliminating personal use of rewards coupons. For example, 
an employer could institute a policy that all rewards coupons earned 
through purchases on a corporate credit card or with reimbursed 
employee funds must be applied toward future business purchases.
191
 In 
                                                     
187. Even a coupon with a small face value (e.g., five dollars) would likely not qualify as a de 
minimis fringe under section 132 because it is “cash equivalent” and therefore presents no valuation 
difficulties. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(c) (as amended in 1992).  
188. One alternative would thus be for legislators to amend section 132 and provide for a specific 
exemption for cash coupon programs. Another option would be for legislators to amend section 
132(e) to provide that rewards coupons qualify as de minimis fringe benefits, although this may 
encourage taxpayers to assert that other easy-to-value benefits should be similarly treated. A final 
option would be to amend Code section 102 and provide that the coupons constitute tax-free gifts to 
the employee. While section 102(a) generally exempts gifts from income tax, current section 102(c) 
specifies that this exemption does not apply to gifts made to employees by employers. Thus, 
legislators would need to amend section 102(c) to carve out the receipt of cash rewards coupons 
accorded by third-party vendors.  
189. Congress could amend section 274 of the Code to provide for the ninety-five percent 
deduction limitation in this context. If rewards coupons were treated as excludable employee gifts 
under section 102(a), see supra note 188, then the ninety-five percent limitation might be added to 
Code section 274(b), which currently limits deductions for business gifts to twenty-five dollars. 
(The proposed deduction limitation would also technically apply to sole proprietors claiming a 
business deduction for their own office supplies; admittedly, in this context, its application would be 
more difficult for the IRS to enforce.) 
190. See generally Jay A. Soled, Surrogate Taxation and the Second-Best Answer to the In-Kind 
Benefit Valuation Riddle, 2012 BYU L. REV. 153. 
191. It is important to note that with respect to other expenditures that give rise to customer 
loyalty rewards (e.g., airline tickets, hotel rooms, and rental car purchases), a similar approach may 
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that case, there would be no personal benefit to the employee, and the 
employer should be allowed a full business deduction for the expense. 
C. Taxing Mixed-Use Assets 
Employer-provided internet service and cell phone use are currently 
enjoyed free of tax consequences by many employees.
192
 This situation 
should not continue: a portion of the benefit representing personal 
consumption should be taxed to the employee. That portion should be 
determined by applying a fixed ratio to the total cost of the service, with 
an opt-out option available under specified conditions for employees. 
We draw this conclusion for several reasons. 
First, like the use of customer loyalty rewards for personal travel, the 
receipt of free cell phone and/or internet access for personal use is 
clearly an accession to wealth that represents income. However, in 
contrast to customer loyalty rewards, valuation is not necessarily an 
issue for mixed-use assets. Consider an employer-provided cell phone 
that is offered by the employer for business reasons but that comes with 
no restrictions on personal use. Assume, as is typical, that the cell phone 
service contract provides for either unlimited calls or a high volume of 
minutes for a flat monthly fee, say $100 per month. At the end of the 
month, an accounting of all of the employee’s personal calls versus 
business calls would reveal the ratio of personal time to total time spent 
using the phone. It seems logical, therefore, to assume that the ratio 
could simply be applied to the $100 fee to determine the monthly 
personal benefit to the employee. The same approach could be used for 
internet service as well. 
However, the ease of valuing personal versus business use of mixed-
use assets is slightly simplified in the above hypothetical. For example, 
some cell phone plans bundle services, so allocating costs among 
various features like phone calls, text, and data usage might be difficult. 
Consider a hypothetical cell phone plan that offers 500 minutes of 
calling time plus unlimited text messages for $100 per month. If an 
employee spends 200 minutes of time on work calls, 200 minutes on 
personal calls, and sends 50 personal text messages, how much of the 
$100 is allocated to personal use? What about an employee who spends 
10 minutes of time on work calls and makes no personal calls but sends 
500 personal text messages? Thus, depending on the bundling of various 
                                                     
be taken: absent the employer eliminating personal use of such benefits, the amount deductible 
would be limited.  
192. See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 7, at 22, tbl.D-1. 
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services, allocation issues might exist. 
The bigger hurdle for mixed-use assets, however, is recordkeeping. 
Even assuming a relatively simple fee structure (e.g., $100 per month for 
phone calls only), making a monthly accounting of business versus 
personal calls constitutes a rather onerous requirement for a taxpayer. 
Without some kind of automated tracking system in place,
193
 employees 
would either have to keep detailed logs or parse through their monthly 
bill to separate business and personal time. Employees may keep poor 
records and inadvertently make mistakes; or, worse, they may 
intentionally underreport personal use to their employers. Placing the 
burden on employers to track business versus personal use would be 
costly for the employer, and employees may view this as an invasion of 
their privacy. 
To avoid these recordkeeping costs, in addition to the potential 
allocation issues in bundled service plans, policymakers should tax 
employees on a fixed percentage of the cost of mixed-use assets like 
smartphones. One option would be to adopt a 50/50 allocation, 
essentially assuming that the asset is used for personal purposes half of 
the time. This is similar to the approach that Congress adopted in section 
274, which effectively treats business meals as having a 50/50 
business/personal allocation.
194
 Another option, which may be more 
politically palatable, is to adopt a more taxpayer-friendly approach and 
skew the allocation toward business use, e.g., 80/20. In the case of such 
an allocation, a taxpayer whose employer provided her a cell phone with 
unlimited calls and texts for a cost (to the employer) of $100 per month 
would be taxed on $20 per month.
195
 The employer would report the 
                                                     
193. It is possible, however, that mobile applications could be used to automatically track 
business calls and provide summary information at the end of each month. Mobile apps today can 
track anything from how many times a user unlocks her phone during the day to the number of 
minutes spent on a particular website like Facebook. See Katy Hall, These Apps Help You Realize 
How Much Time You Waste on Your Phone, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/05/apps-smartphone-use-_n_6096748.html 
[https://perma.cc/ELC6-7BEK]. 
194. Section 274 accomplishes this by limiting the deduction to the employer to fifty percent of 
the meal’s cost, however, rather than taxing the employee. I.R.C. § 274(n) (2012). 
195. Note that the fair market value of a fringe benefit is equal to the amount that the employee 
would have to pay for the service in an arm’s-length transaction, and the employer’s cost is not 
determinative. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(b)(2) (as amended in 2012); see also I.R.S. Notice 2009-
46, 2009-23 I.R.B. 1068, https://www.irs.gov/irb/2009-23_IRB/ar07.html [https://perma.cc/SVJ2-
SXK9]. In the case of cell phone service, the employer’s cost might be less than the employee’s 
potential cost, particularly if the employer takes advantage of a group discount, which would result 
in slight undervaluation of the benefit to the employee. This undervaluation is not a bad result if a 
taxpayer-friendly approach is desired, but it may also justify using a 50/50 allocation between 
business and personal use rather than a more favorable 80/20 allocation. 
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income as additional wages on her pay stub and W-2 and withhold tax. 
Adopting a fixed allocation should result in minimal costs for the 
employer and zero administrative costs for the employee. The employer 
already has access to the information regarding the cost of phone or 
internet access provided to its employees,
196
 and applying a fixed ratio 
and adding it to monthly wages would be relatively simple. 
Employees may object on the ground that a fixed allocation overtaxes 
them, particularly if they spend little personal time on employer-
provided devices or if they would have otherwise purchased a cheaper 
plan for themselves. However, neither of these concerns carries much 
weight. First, employees should be able to opt out of mixed-use assets. 
In other words, if an employer provides a cell phone for business 
purposes, employees who wish to keep a separate cell phone for personal 
purposes
197
 should be able to agree with their employer that the 
employer-provided phone will be used for business purposes only.
198
 
Such employees should not be subject to tax on their employer-provided 
phone.
199
 Second, it seems unlikely that paying tax on a portion of an 
employer-provided plan would be more costly than purchasing one’s 
own separate plan. Consider again an employee whose employer 
provides her with a smartphone that costs $100 per month, and assume 
she is treated as having $50 of income per month from the phone service 
under a 50/50 allocation. Assuming a marginal tax rate of thirty percent, 
the employee’s monthly cost for the personal use of her phone would be 
                                                     
196. Even in the case of a service plan that provides service to numerous phones at an aggregate 
cost to the employer (akin to a personal “family plan”), employers should be able to prorate that 
cost among the number of phones provided with relative ease.  
197. This might not be uncommon. For example, many employees may wish to keep personal 
communications separate for privacy reasons. 
198. This would likely impose some additional administrative cost because, presumably, 
employers would have to periodically audit employee use or have a system to otherwise verify that 
the phone was not being used for personal purposes. This also leaves open the possibility of abuse 
by employees who might intentionally misrepresent that they will only use their employer-provided 
phone for business purposes. Employers could require employees to show proof of their own 
personal service contract (e.g., a monthly bill for the employee’s personal cell phone) as a condition 
of avoiding tax withholding, but this would not help the individual who does not wish to use a cell 
phone for personal purposes at all.  
The IRS and Treasury proposed a similar approach in I.R.S. Notice 2009-46, 2009-23 I.R.B 1069. 
Under the proposal, cell phone use would not be taxed if employers restricted usage to minimal 
personal use. All of the employee’s use would be deemed to be business use if he could provide to 
his employer “sufficient records to establish that the employee maintains and uses a personal (non-
employer-provided) cell phone for personal purposes.” Id. 
199. A cell phone provided for business use only would be an excludable working condition 
fringe benefit under section 132(d). 
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$15.
200
 She is still likely to come out ahead economically in this 
scenario, as it is unlikely that she could purchase her own personal plan 
at a cheaper cost. 
The fact that the tax on mixed-use assets would be withheld 
periodically makes income inclusion a particularly attractive policy 
choice in this context. Including relatively small amounts of income in 
an employee’s paycheck each month and withholding tax would likely 
make the regime less psychologically painful for employees, who may 
not even notice a slightly smaller paycheck. As compared to taxing other 
types of fringe benefits, taxing mixed-use assets may therefore be met 
with less political resistance. 
The parallels between mixed-use assets and business meals may 
suggest that an approach comparable to Code section 274 should be 
taken in the context of mixed-use assets, but a close examination shows 
that this is not the case. Rather, taxing employees on mixed-use assets 
but allowing them to opt out is a more sensible approach. 
Like mixed-use assets, business meals paid for by an employer 
involve both a business element and a personal benefit. Section 274(n) 
addresses this issue by denying the employer a deduction for fifty 
percent of the cost of business meals, while the employee does not have 
income from receipt of the meal.
201
 The result is a form of surrogate 
taxation, which effectively taxes a portion of the employee benefit by 
denying the deduction to the employer. Because the business and 
personal elements of a meal cannot be separated, employers have little 
choice but to bear the cost of the meal with a limited deduction.
202
 
However, in the case of mixed-use assets, the business and personal 
elements can be separated. If employers were denied a deduction for 
some portion of the cost of unrestricted-use cell phones and/or internet 
service, it is likely that many would respond by simply restricting the 
use of the assets to business only.
203
 Consider again the employer-
provided cell phone that costs $100 per month for unlimited calls and 
texts. The out-of-pocket cost to the employer is the same regardless of 
whether it lets the employee make personal calls on the phone; but if the 
employer were denied a deduction and thus chose to restrict the use of 
the phone to business only, the cost would be fully deductible. It is, 
                                                     
200. 30% x $50 income = $15 tax. 
201. I.R.C. § 274(n) (2012). 
202. Presumably, employers will only pay for meals that have a business benefit that exceeds the 
cost of the meal, taking into account the limited deduction.  
203. The cost of cell phones and internet access restricted to business use only would be fully 
deductible under section 162. Id. § 162. 
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therefore, sensible for an employer to only offer phones or internet 
access with restricted use.
204
 
The problem with this scenario is that an employee whose employer 
provides a restricted-use cell phone would be forced to maintain a 
separate phone for personal purposes. The employee might pay $100 per 
month for the same plan that the employer provides, resulting in $200 
per month in total costs for duplicative services and no additional tax 
revenue to the federal government. This expenditure would constitute a 
deadweight loss to the economy. The best solution, therefore, would be 
to allow a full deduction for employers but to tax employees on the 
mixed-use assets, with an option to opt out if they chose to purchase 
their own cell phone and/or internet service instead of using the business 
technology for personal use. 
Taxing a fixed portion of mixed-use assets is a departure from the 
IRS’s current approach with respect to employer-provided cell phones, 
which is to treat most personal use as a nontaxable de minimis fringe 
benefit.
205
 However, treating free personal cell phone service as a de 
minimis fringe does not comport with the modern realities of cell phone 
use. Recall that a de minimis fringe benefit is one with a value so small, 
taking into account frequency, that accounting for it would be 
“unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”206 While occasional 
cocktail parties and holiday gifts are de minimis fringe benefits, season 
tickets to sporting events and daily commuting use of an employer-
provided car are not.
207
 Having daily and possibly unlimited access to a 
free cell phone is more akin to having daily use of a car or regular seats 
at a baseball game than it is to an occasional meal or cocktail party. The 
vast majority of individuals today own a cell phone,
208
 and having one’s 
                                                     
204. Employers might restrict internet access by requiring login through an employer-provided 
portal that limits the user to particular websites. There are also a number of software programs that 
block specific websites and applications, which can limit personal use of employer-provided 
devices. See, e.g., Barracuda Web Security Gateway, BARRACUDA, https://www.barracuda.com/ 
products/websecuritygateway [https://perma.cc/CQ96-52LG] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016); Web 
Filtering Software — Block Internet Access, BROWSECONTROL, http://www.browsecontrol.com/ 
web-filtering/ [https://perma.cc/HP2Y-4HUP] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
205. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Although the IRS capitulated in 2011, two years 
prior it issued a notice seeking public comments on several proposals to tax personal use of 
employer-provided cell phones. See I.R.S. Notice 2009-46, 2009-23 I.R.B. 1068, 
https://www.irs.gov/irb/2009-23_IRB/ar07.html [https://perma.cc/SVJ2-SXK9] (“[T]o the extent 
the employee uses the employer’s cell phone for personal purposes, the fair market value of such 
usage is includable in the employee’s gross income.”).  
206. I.R.C. § 132(e). 
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1)–(2) (as amended in 1992). 
208. Cell Phone and Smartphone Ownership Demographics, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET, SCI. & 
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employer bear financial responsibility for this service is a regular and 
financially significant benefit.
209
 
The fact that an individual employee may only occasionally use an 
employer-provided cell phone for personal use does not change the 
nature of the benefit. An individual who wishes to maintain even a bare-
bones personal cell phone plan will likely have to pay at least $60 per 
month,
210
 and it is likely that most employer-provided phones offer even 
greater benefits than a bare-bones plan. A free monthly gym 
membership offered by an employer is a taxable fringe benefit
211
 even if 
the employee never goes to the gym or visits just once a month. 
Presumably, an employee whose sporadic use of the gym did not justify 
the tax burden would opt out of the membership altogether. Similarly, as 
noted above, employees who do not want to use their work phones for 
personal purposes can opt out of a mixed-use phone. But the reality is 
that most employees with employer-provided devices likely take 
advantage of this significant and valuable benefit, and the freedom to do 
so is still there for those who do not. This is yet another example of a 
benefit that highly compensated employees can currently enjoy free of 
tax consequences. 
D. Taxing Workplace Lifestyle Enhancements 
Workplace lifestyle enhancements (e.g., free dance lessons or yoga 
classes) do not fall within the ambit of working condition fringe benefits 
or de minimis fringe benefits and therefore should be taxable to 
employees. In fact, under current law, some lifestyle enhancement fringe 
benefits, such as free on-site meals provided to promote goodwill or 
morale in the workplace, are currently includable in employees’ 
income.
212
 However, due to administrative constraints, taxing employees 
directly on the economic value of such benefits is far from ideal. 
                                                     
TECH, http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/mobile/cell-phone-and-smartphone-ownership-
demographics/ [https://perma.cc/XD42-6PAA] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016) (reporting that ninety 
percent of American adults own a cell phone and sixty-four percent own a smartphone). 
209. For example, the annual cost to maintain a smartphone is generally at least $1200. See 
Brodkin, supra note 112. 
210. The average cost of a cell phone that is not a smartphone is estimated to be $63 per month, 
while a smartphone costs around $100. Brodkin, supra note 112.  
211. Section 132 excludes from taxation the use of on-site gyms but not employer-provided 
memberships at health clubs. I.R.C. § 132(j)(4); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(2) (stating that 
athletic club membership is not a de minimis fringe benefit regardless of frequency with which 
employee uses the facility). 
212. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1985). 
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Therefore, the best solution is a form of surrogate taxation in which 
Congress would deny employers’ deductibility of such purchases. 
A comparison of workplace lifestyle enhancements to other types of 
fringe benefits, from both the employer’s perspective and the 
employee’s perspective, highlights the details of why denying 
employers’ deductibility is the best solution for taxation of lifestyle 
enhancements. 
From the employer’s perspective, lifestyle enhancements, unlike 
customer loyalty rewards, involve costs that are borne directly by the 
employer; thus, denying a deduction is a viable option here. Further, as 
compared to mixed-use assets, the nature of lifestyle enhancements is 
fundamentally different. More specifically, while a mixed-use asset such 
as a cell phone would commonly be offered for noncompensatory 
business purposes from the employer’s perspective (e.g., to reach the 
employee at night and on weekends), lifestyle enhancements such as 
dance lessons are generally compensatory in nature. The former has an 
incidental personal benefit motivated by the employer’s own business 
needs; the focal point of the latter is to enhance personal satisfaction, 
with the motivating intent to promote morale, attract and retain talent, 
and facilitate long hours at the workplace.
213
 
There are fundamental differences from the employee’s perspective, 
as well, that should inform the choice of policy. For most employees, an 
employer-provided cell phone that can be used for personal purposes 
eliminates a cost for service that the employee would otherwise incur. 
Mixed-use assets like cell phones and internet service are so commonly 
used that it is unlikely that a significant number of employees would be 
forced to consume services that they would not otherwise consume in 
their personal lives. But this is not necessarily true of workplace lifestyle 
enhancements. Consider an employer who provides on-site massages or 
free dance lessons. Would an employee otherwise consume those 
services? The answer is not as clear in this case. Some employees may 
take advantage of services that they would never otherwise “treat” 
themselves to, and others may even feel compelled to engage in 
employer-provided activities to be viewed as a “team player.” In the 
latter case, employees might particularly object to being treated as 
having received income, which makes denying an employer deduction a 
more attractive option. 
                                                     
213. In the case of employer-provided cell phones, the IRS has taken the position that phones 
offered to promote morale or attract talent are primarily compensatory in nature and, therefore, 
taxable. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-72, 2011-36 I.R.B. 407. Similarly, the fact that lifestyle 
enhancements are primarily compensatory in nature presents an even stronger case for taxation. 
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Denying an employer deduction for lifestyle enhancements is also 
preferable to taxing employees on the benefit because of the 
administrative difficulties involved in taxing the employees. There are 
two possible ways to tax employees on lifestyle enhancements, but both 
options involve problematic valuation or recordkeeping. 
First, employees could be taxed on the value of the benefits made 
available to them at the workplace. If a Silicon Valley company provides 
free breakfast and lunch in the cafeteria, free massages, and free dry-
cleaning services, an employee might be taxed on a fixed amount each 
month that represents the average use of all of those services. For 
example, the amount could be based on the average price of daily 
breakfast and lunch for one month added to the average monthly cost of 
massages and dry-cleaning services. To calculate these averages, 
employers might be allowed to make simplified conclusions, such as 
assuming that certain services are used once per month.
214
 The problem 
with this approach is twofold: on the one hand, it is almost certain to 
overtax employees who do not frequently avail themselves of lifestyle 
enhancements offered at their workplace; on the other hand, those who 
most frequently avail themselves of these benefits may be undertaxed. 
As discussed above, the use of many of these services—dance lessons or 
yoga classes, for example—is not as ubiquitous as something like cell 
phone or internet usage. Taxing employees on the value of available 
benefits would not only be inaccurate in many cases but would likely be 
met with fierce political resistance.
215
 
Another option for taxing employees would be to tax them on the 
value of only those benefits that they actually use. For example, an 
employee would be taxed on the fair market value of any free meal that 
he eats in the cafeteria and any dry-cleaning service that he uses in a 
given month. While this approach would be better targeted than taxing 
all available benefits, the recordkeeping and other administrative costs 
make it an unattractive policy. Tracking the cost of each individual meal 
consumed by an employee at work, for example, would likely be 
extremely burdensome for the employer.
216
 While tracking less 
                                                     
214. For example, assume that employees can avail themselves of a thirty-minute Swedish 
massage at the office and that the fair market value of this service is $50. Further, assume that 
unlimited dry-cleaning services are offered and that the average monthly cost of dry cleaning in the 
employer’s locality is $30. Employees would have additional compensation each month of $50 plus 
$30 if these services were offered at their workplace.  
215. The exception might be free cafeteria meals. If many or most employees eat employer-
provided meals as opposed to bringing meals from home, then taxing an average monthly cost 
would not necessarily overtax a significant number of employees. 
216. On the other hand, it is possible that technology is or will eventually be available that would 
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frequently consumed benefits (e.g., dance lessons) would be less 
burdensome, it would still impose additional administrative costs that 
might not justify the revenue collected. Additionally, benefits that are 
infrequently consumed may be less likely to be perceived as income by 
employees,
217
 and having inconsistent amounts of tax withheld month to 
month may be confusing to salaried employees. 
Due to these valuation and recordkeeping issues, and due to the 
fundamental differences between lifestyle enhancements and other types 
of fringe benefits, a better approach in this context is to deny a deduction 
to the employer for all or a portion of the cost of the benefit. In that case, 
the employee would not have income upon receipt of the benefit. The 
result, in effect, would be a form of surrogate taxation where the 
employer is taxed on the benefit to the employee. Consider, for example, 
an employer that provides free dance lessons worth $100 to an 
employee. Under a system where such benefits were taxable to 
employees, the employee would include $100 of income and, assuming a 
marginal tax rate of thirty-five percent, would owe tax of $35. Under a 
system that instead denied a deduction to the employer, the employee 
would owe no tax on the $100 benefit. The employer, however, would 
lose the $100 deduction. Assuming the employer’s marginal tax rate is 
also thirty-five percent, the employer would lose a $35 benefit, and the 
government would gain $35.
218
 Under either scenario, the government 
receives a $35 benefit.
219
 
Both scenarios are more beneficial than the current system, under 
which employers take deductions for lifestyle enhancements but 
employees do not include them in income;
220
 however, denying the 
                                                     
allow for fairly easy electronic tracking. For example, an employee could be required to take her 
meal to a register in the cafeteria to be itemized, and the cost could be electronically attributed to 
her via an employee ID number. The same system could be used for other workplace benefits. 
Employers could then make a monthly accounting of these types of benefits and add the appropriate 
amount of income to the employee’s paycheck.  
217. The assumption here is that although the benefit may be infrequently consumed, it is too 
valuable (or still consumed too frequently) to constitute a de minimis fringe benefit under section 
132(e).  
218. At a marginal tax rate of thirty-five percent, a $100 deduction would save a taxpayer $35 in 
tax and is thus economically equivalent to a $35 benefit to the taxpayer.  
219. Of course, tax rates among employees and employers will not always be identical. In cases 
where employers’ tax rates exceed employees’ tax rates, denying employer deductions will generate 
more revenue than taxing employees. On the other hand, for employers with net operating losses or 
very low effective tax rates, denying employer deductions would raise less revenue than taxing 
employees at fair market value.  
220. If the marginal rates for both the employer and the employee were thirty-five percent, then 
taxing the employee on a $100 benefit would result in a wash to the government because the $35 of 
tax collected from the employee would be offset by the employer’s deduction, also worth $35. The 
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employer’s deduction is a more practical approach in the case of lifestyle 
enhancements. Denying an employer deduction would vastly simplify 
the administrative burden of taxing lifestyle enhancements that are 
offered to multiple employees. This approach would obviate the need to 
keep track of actual consumption by various employees or to calculate 
average use for various types of benefits. No additional tax 
recordkeeping would be required at all. Although employers might 
object to losing deductions for these types of benefits, denying 
deductions to the employers who currently offer them—the Googles and 
Facebooks of the world—will be more politically palatable than taxing 
employees. Employers will likely undergo a cost-benefit analysis to 
determine if they will continue offering such benefits. If the cost of 
something like dry cleaning or yoga classes is not worth it to the 
employer without the benefit of a deduction, then presumably employers 
will shift to other, deductible forms of compensation. 
Another option would be to deny employers some, but not all, of the 
deduction for the cost of lifestyle enhancements. As discussed above, 
this is the approach taken in section 274, which limits employer 
deductions for business meals to fifty percent of the cost. In the case of 
free on-site meals that are not eligible for exclusion under section 119,
221
 
section 274 may already limit the employer’s deduction to fifty percent 
(at the same time, interestingly, that such meals are includable in 
employees’ income).222 In upcoming clarification regarding whether free 
                                                     
same would be the case for a system that denied a deduction to the employer (gain of $35 to the 
government) but did not tax the employee (loss of $35 to the government). However, both of those 
scenarios are better (by $35) than the current one, which involves a deduction for the employer (loss 
of $35 to government) with no offsetting tax collected from the employee. In other words, the 
current system puts the government at a revenue loss for each benefit conferred, equal to the value 
of the employer’s deduction. 
221. Under section 119 of the Code, on-site meals provided “for the convenience of the 
employer” are not taxable to the employee. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a) (as amended in 1985). 
Consider, for example, a bank that restricts employee lunch breaks to thirty minutes because of the 
high volume of customers during the lunch hour. If employees are unable to obtain lunch off-site in 
under thirty minutes, the bank can provide free on-site lunch to its employees without tax 
consequences to the employees. Id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(b), 1(f) ex. 4. In the case of workplace 
lifestyle enhancements, free cafeteria meals would not qualify for exclusion under section 119 if 
they were not offered for the convenience of the employer, i.e., if they were not offered for a 
substantial noncompensatory business purpose. See id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i).  
222. Free cafeteria meals that qualify for exclusion under section 119 are fully deductible to the 
employer, notwithstanding the fifty percent limitation under section 274(n) for deducting business 
meals. See I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(B) (2012) (excluding de minimis fringes from the limitation); id. 
§ 132(e) (including section 119 meals in the definition of “de minimis fringes”). But in the case of 
free on-site meals that do not qualify for exclusion under section 119 or section 132, the law 
concerning deductibility is somewhat unclear. If meals are taxable as compensation to employees, 
presumably they should be fully deductible under section 162 from the employer’s perspective. To 
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on-site cafeteria meals at companies like Google and Facebook are 
taxable,
223
 policymakers should also clarify whether section 274 applies 
to the employer. If it does, Congress may wish to implement a parallel 
scheme for other, comparable lifestyle enhancements that limits 
employer deductions to fifty percent while exempting the benefits from 
employee taxation. 
Employers may argue that most lifestyle enhancements offered at the 
workplace are de minimis. However, it is important to note that the 
lifestyle enhancements discussed here—massages, dance classes, and the 
like—generally do not constitute de minimis fringe benefits under 
section 132(e). Recall that a de minimis fringe is a noncash benefit “the 
value of which [is] . . . so small as to make accounting for it 
unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”224 Generally, the 
frequency with which a benefit is provided to an employee is taken into 
account in determining whether the value is de minimis.
225
 Thus, 
flowers, fruit, and similar property provided to employees “under special 
circumstances (e.g., on account of illness, outstanding performance, or 
family crisis)” are considered to be de minimis, while season tickets to 
the theater and daily commuting use of an employer-provided car are 
                                                     
impose tax on the employees and limit the employer’s deduction would effectively tax the benefit 
twice. However, on its face, the section 274(n) deduction limitation appears to apply because the 
exception for “expenses treated as compensation” under section 274(e)(2) covers “entertainment, 
amusement, or recreation” but does not reference meals. See id. § 274(n)(2)(A). On the other hand, 
the legislative history to section 274(n) clearly contemplates that meals treated as employee 
compensation should be fully deductible. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 124 (1985) (“[T]he cost of a 
meal or of an entertainment activity is fully deductible if the full value thereof is taxed as 
compensation to the recipients . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
223. Treasury and the IRS have put “[g]uidance under [section] 119 . . . regarding employer-
provided meals” on their 2014–2015 Priority Guidance Plan. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra 
note 146, at 10. Because section 119 does not apply in the absence of a substantial 
noncompensatory business purpose, the daily provision of free on-site meals (often of the gourmet 
variety) at Silicon Valley companies like Google and Facebook is likely at odds with section 119. 
The current practice, however, appears to be for many employers to not include these meals in 
employees’ income. See Maremont, supra note 7. 
The proper application of section 119 in this context is beyond the scope of this analysis and has 
been discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Givati, supra note 16; Lomax, supra note 8; Lundin & Cowan, 
supra note 8; Maremont, supra note 7; Richard Rubin, No Free Lunch for Companies as IRS 
Weighs Meal Tax Rules, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Sept. 4, 2014, 7:11 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2014-09-04/no-free-lunch-for-companies-as-irs-weighs-meal-tax-rules 
[https://perma.cc/3VA6-3GM7]. For purposes of this discussion, we are focused on potential 
methods of taxing meals (and other lifestyle enhancements) that do not otherwise qualify for income 
exclusion under section 119, section 132, or some other Code provision. 
224. I.R.C. § 132(e). 
225. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(1) (as amended in 1992). However, where it is administratively 
difficult to determine frequency with respect to an individual employee, frequency can be 
determined with respect to the entire workforce. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(2). 
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not.
226
 
As discussed in Section II.A, lifestyle enhancements have emerged as 
a way for employers to blur the lines between employees’ business and 
personal lives in order for employers to attract talent and encourage 
workplace productivity. Thus, most of these benefits are available to 
employees on a daily or otherwise frequent basis rather than just on 
special occasions. This level of frequency would prevent lifestyle 
enhancements from being considered de minimis even if the fair market 
value of a single use of a particular service were small. Consider, for 
example, an employer that offers free laundry machines for personal use 
at the office. While a comparable service at a laundromat may only cost 
a few dollars for onetime use, free anytime use for all employees would 
not be considered de minimis.
227
 Further, the Treasury regulations under 
section 132 emphasize the frequency with which benefits are made 
“available” to employees rather than the frequency with which benefits 
are “used” by employees.228 Thus, free laundry services would not be 
considered de minimis merely because few employees avail themselves 
of the benefit.
229
 
CONCLUSION 
Twenty-first century fringe benefits present a significant challenge to 
the integrity of the income tax system. Currently, many fringe benefits 
go unreported, a position that the IRS commonly accepts and, to date, 
for which Congress appears to give its tacit approval. This laissez-faire 
approach is inequitable
230
 and inefficient; and if it continues, taxpayer 
                                                     
226. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1)–(2). An occasional group meal or food at a holiday party would 
qualify as a de minimis fringe benefit under section 132(e).  
227. An analogous example in the regulations is personal use of an employer copy machine. Such 
use is de minimis only if it is “occasional” and if the employer “exercises sufficient control and 
imposes significant restrictions on the personal use of the machine so that at least 85 percent of the 
use of the machine is for business purposes.” Id. § 1.132-6(e)(1). This suggests that daily, 
unrestricted personal use of an employer’s copy machine would not be de minimis. 
228. See, e.g., id. § 1.132-6(d)(2)(i)(A) (“Whether meal money or local transportation fare is 
provided to an employee on an occasional basis will depend upon the frequency i.e., the availability 
of the benefit and regularity with which the benefit is provided by the employer to the employee.” 
(emphasis in original)); id. § 1.132-6(e)(2) (stating that country club or gym membership not de 
minimis “regardless of the frequency with which the employee uses the facility”). 
229. Even if certain lifestyle enhancements are offered only on an occasional basis to employees, 
the fair market value of those benefits may still be too large for the benefits to be considered de 
minimis, although it is unclear exactly where to draw the line in value. For example, occasional 
theater and sports tickets are considered de minimis, but one-time weekend use of an employer’s 
beach house is not de minimis. Id. § 1.132-6(e)(1)–(2).  
230. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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noncompliance in this sphere of the law is bound to have a significant 
corrosive effect in other spheres of tax compliance.
231
 
When it comes to modern fringe benefits, Congress has several 
possible options that it should consider: exclude them from employee 
income, include them in employee income, or deny employer 
deductibility of such expenditures. In choosing among these three 
options, Congress should examine each fringe benefit carefully (or 
delegate this responsibility to the Treasury Department). In those cases 
when individual wealth accretion is minimal and little tax revenue is at 
risk, Congress should exclude the fringe benefit from income. But, as in 
most cases, when individual wealth accretion is significant and tax 
revenue is at risk, Congress should collect revenue from either the 
employee or the employer. When possible, Congress should tax income 
that inures to employees. And when employers make valuable fringe 
benefits available for personal use that are difficult to tax to employees, 
Congress should instead deny employers deductions for part or all of the 
concomitant expenditures that they incur. 
Rather than focus on today’s new breed of fringe benefits, some 
commentators might argue that congressional energies would be better 
spent focused on so-called big-ticket items, such as ascertaining the 
appropriate capital gain tax rates, the tax treatment of employer-provided 
health insurance as income, or whether residential mortgage interest 
should remain deductible. However, modern fringe benefits are a much 
larger revenue source than commonly presumed, and their lack of 
taxation necessitates immediate congressional attention. Congress 
should not dally; it should reform the Code to strengthen the integrity of 
the nation’s tax system. 
 
                                                     
231. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Economics of Strong Reciprocity, in MORAL 
SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 
151, 167 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005) (noting that “if people believe that cheating on taxes, 
corruption, or abuses of the welfare state are widespread, they themselves are more likely to cheat 
on taxes, take bribes, or abuse welfare state institutions”); cf. Zelenak, supra note 15, at 854 
(arguing that “customary deviations [such as sanctioning the nonreporting of frequent-flier miles] 
may have contributed to an insufficient respect for the dictates of the Code on the part of high-level 
Treasury Department and IRS officials”). 
